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Abstract:
The Twenty-First Century has seen increasing support for far-right authoritarian policies across
Europe, particularly in France. This paper identifies and explains the connection between the
rising power of France’s far-right, populist party and the pervasive sentiments of Islamophobia
through an examination of major theories, anxiety-producing events, and reactionary legal
actions in France pertaining to the oppression of Muslims. It begins with an analysis of France’s
colonial history and its lasting implications concerning the legitimacy of anti-Muslim rhetoric.
Next, the paper analyzes the usage of terrorism as a framed threat by far-right politicians to
promote authoritarian agendas. It then examines France’s unwillingness and inability to integrate
Muslim immigrants into French society, predicated off of major threat perceptions associated
with Muslims and Islam. Finally, the paper offers an understanding of how the greatest threat to
France is not the electoral success of the Front National, but the historical implications
concerning the increasingly normalized nature of policies supported by the FN.
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Introduction I: Populism and Islamophobia in France

On the 23rd of April, 2017, the nation of France held their presidential elections; in
which no candidate gained a majority of the vote. This precipitated a runoff election on May 7th
between the two forerunners. This election was particularly interesting because neither of the
candidates came from the two centrist, established parties in France, the Parti Socialiste and Les
Republicans. Instead, Emmanuel Macron, of his own new movement, En Marche, and Marine le
Pen, the former head of the far-right populist, nationalist party, Le Front National (FN) beat the
established candidates and faced off in the final election. The vote saw Macron instated as the
new President of France by a substantial majority of 66.1% of the popular vote over Madame Le
Pen’s 33.9%, solidly cementing his presidency at the time.1 However, despite receiving only half
as many votes as Macron, Le Pen’s success drew significant concern from the international
community as France, a nation known for its socialism and its foundations of liberty and
equality, had not experienced such extensive support for xenophobic populism throughout the
existence of the Fifth Republic. In fact, not since the Vichy Dictatorship of World War II had
France permitted far-right politics to garner as much support as the FN did in 2017.
The rise of the FN, now known as the Rassemblement National, is one story among many
parallel trends in other western democratic nations as the 21st century sees a renewed rise in
power among nationalist populist parties.2 The populist parties of Europe including the Golden

Sean Clarke and Josh Holder, “French presidential election May 2017 – full second round results and analysis,”
The Guardian, May 26, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/may/07/french-presidential-election-results-latest.
2
For the purposes of this paper, the Rassemblement National will be referred to by its former abbreviation, the FN.
1
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Dawn, the Austrian Freedom Party, and Alternative for Germany, have experienced increases in
support, political power and influence over the course of the 21st century.3 This rise in populism
comes from several major issues, including economic stagnation, anti-European rhetoric,
national pride, and anti-immigration sentiments. In particular, populist parties of the 21st century
have increasingly gravitated towards anti-Islamic rhetoric, in keeping with the concerns voiced
by the masses on issues of economic job market saturation, threats of violence in the form of acts
of terror, and inability or perhaps refusal to assimilate and integrate the influx of Muslim
immigrants and refugees.4
This introductory chapter serves two purposes. First, this chapter explains the concepts of
populism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and xenophobic populism, drawing broader connections
between them. This is to provide a better understanding of the assertions and analyses made
throughout the paper. A description of populism will be followed by a discussion on the theory
of ‘othering’ and xenophobia. An analysis of Islamophobia will then follow before explaining
how xenophobia and Islamophobia in particular can be used as fuel for populist movements.
Second, this chapter will provide a roadmap for the rest of the paper. This will include a brief
walkthrough of the major issues addressed in each chapter and their primary purpose in the
paper.

Richard A. DeAngelis, “A Rising Tide for Jean-Marie, Jorg, and Pauline? Xenophobic Populism In Comparative
Perspective,” Australian Journal of Politics and History, (2003): 77.
4
Sabri Ciftci, “Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no. 3 (2012): 293.
3
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Concepts and Theories
Populism
This paper focuses on the rise of populism as a political force in France, but what exactly
is populism? Classical populism can be defined as a political movement which is perceived as
anti-elite, anti-establishment, anti-immigration, and nationalistic, and which claims to be
representing the underrepresented.5 Populism has always had some level of support in
democratic nations, especially from individuals looking for someone to blame for their poor
situations in life. Populism is supported particularly by ethnic ‘in-groups’ and the unemployed,
who see ‘anti-party’ populism as a way for them to be heard in politics. Populism has become a
much discussed phenomenon in recent years due to its rising prominence both inside and outside
of France. The most common example of populist rhetoric success must be President Donald
Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S Presidential elections. His claims of being a Washington
outsider, who was anti-immigration and thrived on chants like ‘drain the swamp,’ a clear call for
anti-establishment and anti-elite policies, all depict an ideal populist candidate. Populism in the
twenty-first century focuses on one policy almost universally across national lines: the
anti-immigration issue. This paper proposes that xenophobia is the driving cause for populism’s
success in this century. More specifically, for France, it is the fuel provided by Islamophobic
sentiments that supports the FN and is, in turn, exacerbated by the framing of major issues in
anti-Islamic images.

5

DeAngelis, 82.

6

Xenophobia
Xenophobia comes from the greek words xenos and phobos respectively meaning
stranger and fear. It is by definition “the fear and hatred of strangers and foreigners or of
anything that is strange or foreign.”6 The existence of xenophobia is an inevitable side effect of
the humans experience. Humans instinctively pursue tribalistic group formations in the search of
safety and collaboration to improve their opportunities to survive and thrive. Part of the process
of group formation is the designation of non-members as out-group members. This
differentiation is accompanied by a negative perception of the non-members as being inferior to
the dominants group. The differentiations used to justify this divide take on many forms,
including race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and technological capability.
Humans who exhibit xenophobia have engaged in a process known as ‘othering,’ which
involves the assessment of an individual or a group lying outside of your adopted ‘in-group’ as
foreign, exotic, and in most cases threatening.7 The ‘out-group’ which is created by these
associations is often judged to be inferior to members of the presiding ‘in-group’ and is
deserving of mistreatment and distrust. Examples of xenophobic ‘othering’ are a constant
presence in the history of man, and the presence of xenophobia has permitted human beings to
engage in act of savagery against one another with the justification of their own superiority. In
this paper, it is the existence of a particular brand of xenophobia which lies central to the
explanation of the rise of populism in France.

6

Merriam Webster Dictionary, “Xenophobia,” accessed February 16, 2019,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/xenophobia.
7
DeAngelis, 83.
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Islamophobia
While xenophobia more generally is a psychological reaction inherent in the process of
‘othering,’ which humans naturally engage in during their creation of in-groups and out-groups,
France’s brand of xenophobia focuses on the demonization and dehumanization of Muslims and
their faith. Islamophobia is a form of “cultural racism,” and is derived from the West’s inability
to accommodate non-Christian religious denominations in their societies.8 While Islamophobia is
difficult to define as there are many elements that compose the fear felt towards Muslims as an
outgroup, the Runnymede report, as reported by Sabri Ciftci, compiled eight major concerns and
issues that are considered in the creations of sentiments of Islamophobia. In summary of these
components, Islamophobia is derived from Western perceptions of the faith as a monolithic bloc
which is different, inferior, and hostile towards the West.9 Furthermore, “hostility to Muslims is
sen as natural or normal” and “is used to justify discriminatory practices toward Muslims and
exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.”10 The intensified process of ‘othering’ which
characterizes the treatment and perceptions of Muslims in European society has lead to
significant divisions surpassing initial fears due to perceived threats which implant a prejudice in
the minds of Europeans. It is also around Islamophobia that modern far-right populism derives
its support.

8

Ciftci, 294.
Ibid., 295.
10
Ibid., 295.
9

8

Xenophobic Populism
Having examined the ideas of populism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, it is time to
address the phenomenon affecting Europe, and more specifically France, in the twenty-first
century. Xenophobic-populism refers to the form of populism demonstrated by the rising
populist parties of this millenium.11 While economic and security-based issues are staples of the
classical populist platform, the most recent wave of populism rose in power despite having
solved issues of these natures in the cases of France, Austria, and Australia.12 For the new wave
of populism, cultural resentment has surged as the driving force behind many successful populist
movements.13
This focus on cultural divisions is central to the platform of the FN and has been since its
rebranding in the 1980s. “(The FN), is not behaviorally extremist or fully ‘anti-system,’
systematically statist, militarist, anti-democratic, violent, social Darwinist, or openly ‘racist’
defiantly using skin colour as a moral category separating the good from the bad.”14 Instead, the
FN has risen to prominence primarily using the sentiments of xenophobia which have been
embedded in the French culture concerning the French Muslim immigrant population and their
descendents.

Road Map

11

DeAngelis, 76.
Ibid., 75.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 88.
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This examination of the connection between Islamophobia and populism in the Fifth
Republic of France contains one more introductory chapter, three body chapters, and a
conclusion. The secondary introductory chapter will examine the primary populist party of
France, the Front National (FN), looking into their history, their ideology, their voting bloc and
the timeline of their successes and failures since their inception in 1972. The next chapter, and
first body chapter, will examine the historical context of Islamophobia in France through the lens
colonialism and postcolonial identity. The second body chapter will advance to the 21st century
with an analysis of the impact of terrorism on political decisions as a result of Islamophobia and
the framing of terror by the media and the FN. The final body chapter will examine the European
Refugee crisis and France’s failure to properly integrate and assimilate Muslim refugees and
immigrants.

Introduction II: The Front National
The second introduction, focusing on the Front National, provides context for the rise of
French populism beyond the framework presented on xenophobia and populism more generally.
Beyond other western European populist parties, the FN has succeeded in garnering large
amounts of support from the French populace and has been dynamic and flexible in their
recruitment of support, diversifying their party and crossing traditional party-line boundaries.
While the efforts of Jean-Marie Le Pen will be addressed, the primary focus of this chapter will
be on the platform of the party under the leadership of the current president of the party, Marine
Le Pen. Looking at her positions on Islam, as well as the positions and sentiment demonstrated
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by the stalwarts of the party, this chapter will contextualize the broader linkages between
xenophobia or rather Islamophobia, and populism, with a focus on France’s unique case.

French Colonialism
The French Imperial Legacy has persisted to modern times by framing the French
perception of Islam and the large minority Muslim population in France. The processes of
colonization and decolonization have impressed upon the French psyche a sense of superiority
over the Muslim Algerians, paired with a fear of their capacity for violence and their inability to
coexist with the values of French republicanism. The Le Pen family often calls upon their
constituents’ desire for power and superiority by referencing back to the times of power and
imperial domination. France has a long and culturally grounded history which remained
relatively homogenous for generations. Idealization of French identity through their cultural
values of Liberte, Egalite, and Fraternite, along with their commitment to secularism or laicite,
has created a society which is prone to accepting the failings of Islam and Muslims, and
perceiving them as a genuine threat to France and her ideals.
The French experience with colonialism has also created demographic changes with the
increased introduction of migrants into France from two major ideological backgrounds; the
pieds-noirs settlers of Algeria, whose history of superiority and dominance in the territory
cemented certain prejudices in their culture, and the Algerian Muslims who began arriving in
greater numbers following the Algerian Revolution, initially as a source of labor. This chapter
will set up the historical context which has permitted the FN’s extreme-right views to enter the
French political discourse under the guise of legitimate defense of French republican ideals,
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explaining the background for modern responses to issues of Muslim immigration and Islamic
terrorism.

Exacerbation of Islamophobia from the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks
The second body chapter of this paper will return to modern events to demonstrate how
the recent acts of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic Fundamentalists in 2015 and 2016 have
exacerbated tensions in France and affected political affiliation and participation through the
introduction of mass fear and anger. After demonstrating how the underlying tensions between
French ideology and Islam came into being in the previous chapter, this chapter will demonstrate
the ability and willingness of the media and the politicians of France to add to the politicization
of terrorism. Terrorism on its own is not a framed type of threat, meaning that in its own
existence, it is able to promote anxiety in a national population simply by reminding individuals
of their own mortality and reviving fears of repeated acts of terrorism.15 However, while the act
of terrorism itself can cause anxiety without any political rhetoric, the threat of terrorism can
easily be co-opted by political parties as a major security issue and transformed into a framed
threat to society.16
With France’s past with Algerian terrorism from the 50s until the 90s being framed as a
product of Islamic teachings, far-right sentiments in France are better capable of manipulating
public anxiety and fear by giving them a scapegoat in these stressing times. The provision of a
scapegoat on which to focus public unrest is by definition one of the primary features of a

Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian, Anxious Politics : Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening
World, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 117.
16
Ibid.
15
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populist movement’s tactics.17 And while research in France has demonstrated that the impacts of
terrorism do not change the public’s political leanings concerning non-security issues like
socio-economic reform, the results of studies conducted by Sylvain Brouard and Pavlos
Vasilopoulos point towards evidence that acts of terrorism in France have sparked a shift towards
support for right-wing authoritarian policies regarding security measures, even at the expense of
civil liberties.18 This shift has been demonstrated not only among the general public of France
but in the actions of the government at the time. This is particularly interesting, because the
French government in charge during the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 was a socialist
government under the leadership of Francois Hollande. Through an analysis of the framing of
acts of terrorism by the media, the general reactions of the public concerning information
seeking, political participation, and shifts in political support for security measures, this chapter
will seek to demonstrate how the FN was able to co-opt fears of terrorism to normalize their
rhetoric and promote increased authoritarian security policies while garnering future support for
their party.

A Clash of Cultures: The French Republican Response to Muslim Migrants
The final chapter will focus on the usage of Muslim immigration as a scapegoat by the
FN. One of the common themes connecting the populist parties of Europe today is their shared
emphasis on classic anti-immigration rhetoric. The xenophobic populism which covers Europe’s
states feeds on nationalistic xenophobic sentiments, proclaimed in large part by the unemployed
white christians and catholics of Europe. With that in mind, this chapter seeks to understand the

17
18

DeAngelis, 82.
Vasilopoulos, 102.
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various threats perceived to be posed by Muslim migrants in France, looking first at the arrival of
migrants in the twentieth century as foreign workers; dealing with how they were treated upon
settling in France. And second, looking at how France has been affected by, and handled, the
European Refugee Crisis which began in 2015 and has resulted in an influx of hundreds of
thousands of Syrian and other Middle Eastern refugees flooding into France and the rest of
Europe.
The Muslim immigrants who have made it to France have always been treated with some
deal of suspicion and apprehension, in large part thanks to the framing placed upon them by the
far-right in France, who has long viewed Muslims as a realistic threat to job security and
personal wellbeing, as well as a symbolic threat to French republicanism and French cultural
identity.
Populism has been on the rise in western democracies across the globe but there have
been few countries in which the movement has gained as much traction as in France. This paper
will seek to prove that the success of the Front National, a xenophobic, anti-immigrant, populist
party has experienced such extensive success and support from the French population due to
engrained Islamophobic sentiments predicated upon perceived threats posed by Muslims dating
back to French colonialism. More recently, the FN has cemented its legitimacy as an acceptable
party in French politics by framing modern issues of unemployment and terrorism as an issue of
security and immigration policy failure. In doing so, the FN utilizes exacerbating factors of
Islamophobia such as terrorism to fuel their mission by contributing to the already growing
Islamophobic sentiment in turn with their xenophobic, fear-based rhetoric. It is this symbiotic
relationship that will be assessed and proven throughout this paper.

14
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Introduction II: Le Front National

Having addressed the relevant political theories for this paper including populism,
xenophobia, Islamophobia, and xenophobic populism, it remains for this paper to ground the
following discussion in concrete terms. While populism can take many forms and is not
demonstrated solely by the success of a single political party, France’s increasing support of
populism will be examined in large part through the rise of Le Front National (FN). The FN is
France’s far-right, extremist, nationalist, populist party which advocates for anti-immigration
policies and a culturally homogenous definition of French national identity. For the purposes of
much of the history on the FN, this chapter will reference Daniel Stockemer, whose historical
accounts and analysis of the FN’s rise to prominence, their policies, and their constituencies, has
proven invaluable in the analysis presented throughout this paper.
In the years following the Second World War, French society was vehemently opposed to
far-right political sentiments. Their internationally perceived failure under the fascist dictatorship
of the Vichy Regime shamed the image of the French Republic, and most were afraid to see any
resurgence of openly racist, xenophobic, far-right political agendas. It was not until the Algerian
Revolution that far-right rhetoric reappeared in political discourse, and decades more before any
central political party was successfully formed around those beliefs.19 It was in this environment
that the Front National (FN) was created under the presidency of Jean-Marie Le Pen, whose
racist and bigoted rhetoric would define the party for decades to come.

Daniel Stockemer, The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine
Le Pen, (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017): 7.
19
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Created in 1972, the FN emerged in France during a period of time represented by the
birth of the new Fifth Republic and the inability of the extreme-right to form anything
resembling a unified party.20 While the Algerian Revolution enabled far-right politicians to once
again participate in the political discourse, no significant single-party was able to form to
represent these sentiments up on the extreme-right side of the political spectrum.21 Even with the
formation of an extreme-right, populist party, support was not immediately forthcoming for
populist rhetoric. Before becoming a prominent party, the FN underwent a period of time defined
as the “crossing of the desert” by Jean-Marie.22 The party failed to break into principal party
politics for the first decade of its existence. This was likely thanks to the various personalities
which defined the FN in its early days, some of which touted openly fascist ties with the Vichy
regime and the Nazi party.23 Later in the 1981 presidential elections, “Le Pen failed to receive the
500 signatures required to run in the 1981 presidential contest.”24 This dismal beginning to the
party came to a close soon afterwards.
Daniel Stockemer proposes several changes in France which might have reflected the rise
of the Front national to the center of the political discourse in the 1980s. One of the structural
changes proposed being the heightened anxiety of immigration brought on by the lax position of
the presiding socialist government under Francois Mitterrand and by the shift in proportionality
of the backgrounds of the immigrants.25 Whereas immigrants to France had historically been
predominantly from European backgrounds, the 1980s experienced a shift toward a North

20

Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 9.
22
Ibid., 13.
23
Ibid., 15.
24
Ibid., 13.
25
Jens Rydgren, The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-nationalist Mobilization in France, (New
York: Berghahn Books, 2004): 120.
21

17

African-heavy migrant pool which had increased in size significantly since the mid-1940s to the
point that 38.5% of all immigrants were of North African origin by 1982.26 This shift in visibility
of North Africans, and by extension Muslims, in France led the FN to rebrand itself as the
foremost part on issues of immigration and security.
The mounting success of the party increased with the change in leadership on January 16,
2011, when Marine Le Pen won the presidency of the FN from her father and instituted changes
to the rhetoric of the party.27 looking to present a less racist public appearance while persisting
with the severity of their anti-immigrant rhetoric. While Marine succeeded in removing most of
the anti-semitic and overtly racist rhetoric from the party’s leadership, she continued to voice
Islamophobic sentiments.
The other major change to occur with the transition of power to Marine Le Pen is that of
increased legitimacy for the party as a defender of republican values. Jean-Marie Le Pen began
the shift away from rampant extremism with slogans expressing solidarity with the people of
France. The populist element of the party was formed to express this affiliation with republican
values. However, Jean-Marie’s anti-semitic comments in the late-1980s hurt their image
significantly, and while support continued to grow, the image of the FN as a republican party
was momentarily tarnished.

Major Ideologies
As with most populist parties, the FN has focused much of their identity around a
ethnocentric-view of nationhood. Supporters of the FN believe that French identity, or the right

26
27

Stockemer, 14.
Ibid., 24.
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to be French is not something that individuals can obtain simply through the naturalization
process. Rather than allowing ‘soil’ to determine the legitimacy of one’s ‘Frenchness,’ the FN
has often expressed the belief that one must merit French identity through complete adherence to
her values and cultural identity.28
The FN has always been portrayed as an anti-immigration party, and they have acted to
perpetuate this depiction. Under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN touted the slogans
La France est pour les français, or “France and French first.”29 These chants evoked French
republican sentiments by framing many issues face by the French population as a direct attack by
the growing Muslim migrant minority against French republican values. Beyond the symbolic
nature spouted as the impending ‘Islamification’ of France and of Europe more broadly, Le Pen
and the FN have framed on the immigration issue as posing a genuine threat to the job security of
the average French citizen.
In the 1980s the FN rebranded away from their historical focus on xenophobia and other
forms of traditional far-right extremism to embrace a new populist image. This transition came in
tandem with the decision of many Muslim migrant workers who had initially served as a
temporary workforce to rebuild France in the post-war era
To harken back to the road map of the previous chapter, the FN has grown in power and
influence because of the symbiotic relationship it has formed with French Islamophobia over the
past four decades. In terms of colonialism, it was perceived threats of Islam fostered by the
Algerian Revolution which permitted far-right political discourse to re-enter French politics.
Rallying around anti-decolonization rhetoric, the founders of the FN, including Jean-Marie Le

28
29

Peter Davies, The National Front in France : Ideology, Discourse and Power (London: Routledge, 1999): 64
Rydgren, 175.

19

Pen entered into French politics and started their careers on the grounds of xenophobic sentiment
and support for French superiority and cultural ideology. Furthermore, France’s colonial history
permits the FN to claim that their actions, demanding the removal of Islam from public spaces
and closing down immigration to Muslim asylum-seekers is not a xenophobic, extreme-right
platform, but a platform in support of protecting French republican ideals of universalism and
secularism from the threat of hyper-religious Muslims.
Marine Le Pen is the most recent member of the Front National party of France to make
headlines for her political achievements and positions of varying matters of policy but she is not
the beginning of the far-right, populist party. Jean-Marie Le Pen created the party back in insert
date, and under his guidance, the party developed a platform which claimed to defend the ‘true’
French citizens from a myriad of threats from abroad. These threats included unfair impositions
from the European Union, economic disadvantages on international markets, incoming refugees
particularly of Muslim origin, and other supposed problems originating from abroad. The Front
National has always been a populist party; proclaiming itself to be the defender of the nations
against all outside influences
By understanding the history of the Front National, it becomes clear that their rise in
popularity and support is not strictly a contemporary phenomena. Rather, the party has been
growing in size and influence since its inception in 1972, and while recent events have allowed
for transitions in their demonstrable influence away from regional success to the ballots of the
executive branch, this is not the main way in which the FN has left the fringes of politics.

20
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A History of Superiority: The Fall of France’s Colonial Empire
Forward
This chapter examines the impacts of France’s colonial and postcolonial past on
continued sentiments of Islamophobia. The classic French national identity often focuses on
universalism and secularism as the primary ideals of French republicanism. This cultural
definition of national identity resonates most with white, catholic, conservative males, who often
see themselves as the true inheritors of France’s legacy. Long before the 21st century, those
adhering to this definition of national identity had trouble accepting foreign influences into
French society, often asking them to assimilate into the French culture. Universalism values of
liberte, egalite, and fraternite have been unquestionable ideals of the French culture for
generations. Those who do not adhere to these ideals are often seen as un-French. While modern
factors have undoubtedly contributed to increasing sentiments of Islamophobia in France, it is
France’s imperial past which cemented her ideals and biases. The Islamophobia formed during
this time has in turn provided far-right extremist populist rhetoric with a powerful cultural
history from which to draw support.
The process of colonization usually comes from the violent suppression of native peoples
by foreign invaders who believe themselves to be more civilized and culturally, religiously, and
ethnically superior. Colonization necessitates the creation of an artificial segregation between
natives and foreigners which is fortified over time through geographic, economic and social
30

separation. Decolonization is the usually violent overthrow of the oppressive colonizers by a
politically and economically disadvantaged indigenous majority. When France went through the
30

Ethan B. Katz, “An Imperial Entanglement: Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Colonialism,” (2018): 1190.
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birth and death of her colonial empire, the increased amount of interactions with colonized
natives fostered feelings of xenophobia. This was most prevalent in the case of French Algeria,
where the French had seen their colony as a direct extension of France herself. Because of the
violent revolution and the subsequent forced repatriation of the former settlers of French Algeria,
known as the pieds-noirs, France has since come to view Islam and Muslims as incompatible
with the French identity. These perceptions persist to modern times and are present in the
discourse of French identity and Islam’s place in contemporary France.

Introduction
While modern factors like terrorism and the European Refugee Crisis have exacerbated
Islamophobia in France, contextual factors have also played a role in predisposing France to
acceptance of far-right rhetoric, namely France’s colonial history and their transition to
postcolonialism. France has old cultural roots, based on strict values of universalism known
better as liberte, egalite, fraternite, and on their commitment to secularism: the mandated
separation of church and state. France continues to adhere to the colonial-era idea of mission
civilisatrice, which states that anyone can become French as long as they adopt the values of
31

French republicanism and abandon their previous cultural values. However, during the period
of colonialism, French interactions with colonized natives sharpened negative stereotypes and
lead to exacerbated distrust and dislike of sub-groups recognized as ‘others,’ namely Muslims.
Because of this, Islamophobia has become ingrained in French cultural identity, which in turn
has made France more susceptible to manipulation by far-right, populist politicians.

Paul A. Silverstein, “The Context of Antisemitism and Islamophobia in France,” Patterns of Prejudice 42, no. 1
(2008): 8.
31

23

Nations which have experienced the power of controlling a colony are often prone to
lasting xenophobic sentiments for two reasons. First, in colonizing a territory, an imperial power
engages in the oppression of those they designated as sub-human natives. This process is enacted
with violence and disregard for the damage to the native population, and often serves to further
cement feelings of superiority in the minds of the colonizers. Second, an imperial power will
likely experience violent retaliation from the natives when the time for revolution arrives. This
process of decolonization in turn exacerbates sentiments of fear of the ‘out-group’ as the former
rulers are deprived of life and power.
This chapter will look at existing theory on the implications of colonialism pertaining to
the creation of xenophobic sentiments. It shall explain how the processes of colonization and
decolonization breed lasting hatred and mutual fear between participants in a colonial system,
due to the violence and segregation present in colonization. This chapter will demonstrate how
these products of colonialism manifest culturally and politically in a postcolonial state. The
chapter will show that the colonization and liberation of Algeria exemplify the existing theory on
said processes of colonization. Later, this chapter will examine the various forms of
Islamophobic fallout that came from the decolonization of Algeria concerning France’s treatment
of Muslims. This will be done through examinations of the changes in France’s demographics
and cultural identity. Through this look at postcolonial Islamophobia, this chapter will show how
the violence of the revolution fostered lasting resentment for Muslims and Islam, further
augmenting the growing Islamophobic sentiments in France dating back to the Crusades. Finally,
the link between the post-colonial French Islamophobia and the support for the populist FN party

24

will be explained through the FN’s manipulation of sentiments of fear, anger, and betrayal
precipitated by the end of the colonial era.

How Colonialism Fostered Xenophobia
It is morbidly ironic and hypocritical that the majority of colonial powers in the twentieth
century were liberal democracies from western Europe. Hypocritical, because France, Spain,
Germany, the U.K and others acted in an uncivilized, barbaric manner in becoming colonial
powers. To subjugate a territory, only the use of violence and the illiberal treatment of the
conquered natives will suffice, and it is their self-justified racism which excuses them from the
32

actions they commit. European empires engaged in colonization with the moral justification
33

that they were spreading civilization to the ‘Oriental’ barbarians of the southern hemisphere.

This justification, stemming from feelings of racial superiority and religious mandate, enabled
European colonizers to perpetrate extensive violence and draft legal systems which
institutionalized segregation between Europeans and non-Europeans.
The process of colonization was brutish and violent, often resulting in breaches of ethics
and even genocide. In his discourse on Colonialism, Aime Cesaire depicts colonization as the
antithesis of civilization for, in being a colonizing power, the colonizers become desensitized to
the violent atrocities carried out against the colonized natives who they are taught to treat as
34

savages. He defines colonization as the “bridgehead in a campaign to civilize barbarism, from
35

which there may emerge at any moment the negation of civilization.” This refers to the
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transformation which occurred among ‘civilized’ peoples when they resorted to the process of
‘othering.’ To subjugate a native people and transform them into an efficient workforce,
colonizers deprived natives of many rights granted to citizens of the state. The colonizer often
viewed the natives as a morally obligated target for conquering under the will of God. Theorists
like Renan stated that civilized, Christian Europeans had a moral obligation to bring about
36

economic prosperity and industry to the lazy, savage, disreputable natives. Often, this divine
sense of superiority resulted in actions which would be seen as crimes against humanity in the
modern era.
Once a territory was successfully conquered, the colonizers would perpetuate the
segregation between the colonizer and the colonized, often through violent means. While this
violence often lessens with time, the ability of the colonizer to brutalize and torture the natives
for purposes of security and order is never eliminated as is done for ‘true citizens.’ Beyond the
violence, colonizers viewed the indigenous population as a source of economic income which
had previously been unharnessed due to the barbarian’s inherent laziness. As per their moral
mandate, European colonizers would take charge of governing, manufacturing and industry,
limiting the roles of the native majority to lesser occupations including agriculture and the
37

provision of manual labor. In doing so, foreigners destroyed the ecosystem of life and culture
which had previously existed in order to establish laws and systems in adherence with their own
beliefs.
Colonizing Africa and other regions also forced Europeans to engage with Muslims to a
greater extent than ever before. European governments separated all involved parties by
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ethnicity, religion, and place of origin, and in doing so, became more accustomed to specific
38

traits which would form the basis of dangerous, divisive stereotypes in the future. Groups like
the Jews and Berbers were separated from Muslims based on traits such as level of religious
fervor and amenability to coexistence with the European settlers. Despite the differentiations, all
colonized groups were treated as inferior beings deserving of foreign rule.
The process of decolonization is alarmingly similar to the initial actions taken in
colonization, the primary difference between the two being the identity of the perpetrator of
violence and murder. Just as the colonizing invaders commit genocide in their efforts to
subjugate those they see as inferior, so too do the natives resort to violence as a means of
political change. Frantz Fanon describes the process of decolonization in certain terms as a
39

violent one. “Decolonization is always a violent event.” The violence of colonization which
was previously diverted from the colonizers through the exhibition of force by police must
eventually cease as the natives recognize that the ones responsible for the theft of their freedom
40

are not one another but the foreign invaders. This change appears to be almost inevitable in
hindsight, as the oppression of a people must eventually exceed the limits of acceptance as has
been demonstrated throughout history in cases from the American, to Kosovo, to Bosnia, to
Algeria; the violent retaliation against lack of representation and exploitation is a natural
occurrence.
In order for a people who have been oppressed for generations to affirm to themselves
their new state of freedom, it becomes necessary to completely supplant the previously existing
rulers. As the process of colonization takes place through the usage of violence, it is natural for
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the colonized to respond with similar methods. In responding with violence, the process of
decolonization contributes further to the colonizer’s xenophobia towards their colonized subjects
as they lose their previously enforced sense of superiority and safety to the violent methods of
decolonization. Just as terrorism spreads anxiety and fear, violent decolonization precipitates an
increased fear of the ‘other’ and a lost sense of security. This transforms the political leanings of
the colonizer by promoting increased desire for security and increased fear of retribution for past
actions.
Colonialism exposed European powers to increased interactions with the indigenous
peoples. In the case of the Muslims, this interaction served as a chance to differentiate between
the Muslims and other factions of the natives.41 This cementing of the reasons and stereotypes
which allowed the Europeans to justify their ‘othering’ of the Muslims plays a significant role in
the persisting Islamophobia in Europe today. The ‘other,’ seen first as inferior, untrustworthy,
and lazy, is transformed through violent actions into a subject of hatred, retribution, and fear.
These two sides of xenophobia, disdain and fear, become embedded in a nation’s psyche. It is the
cementation and fortification of the ‘us vs them’ dynamic which predisposes nations to negative
biases going forward. This chapter will now demonstrate exactly how France experienced the
transformative effects of colonialism, and how the resulting fear of Muslims predisposed them to
the allure of populist rhetoric.
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France and Algeria: How France’s Colonialism Fostered Islamophobia
While Algeria was not the only colony that France created during its reign as an empire,
it was the most important colony in terms of cultural influence, political involvement, and
physical settlement of the territory by Europeans. The relationship between France and Algeria
exemplifies the impacts of colonization and decolonization, and is perfect for analyzing the
lasting impacts of decolonization on French cultural identity and exploring the perpetuation of
Islamophobia. There are several reasons for this. The conquering of Algeria forced the French to
refine their definitions and understandings of Muslims as different from other minority groups.
Interactions with Algeria’s Muslim population prompted settlers to more fully assess Islam as a
faith and culture, eventually designating it as a hostile ‘other,’ in relation to French republican
values. Unlike other French territories, Algeria was considered an extension of France, governed
not by a colonial governor with separate laws, but directly under the authority of the French
government using French laws. Algeria also experienced greater levels of mass settlement than
any other colony at that time. “The settler presence gave Algeria stronger political, social and
42

cultural ties to France than those enjoyed by any other colony.” French and other Europeans
settled in Algeria by the thousands, and due to the long age of of Algeria’s time as a colony,
many generations of colonizers, or pieds-noirs, came to see Algeria as their home. For these
reasons, the loss of French Algeria impacted postcolonial France to a far greater degree than did
the loss of other French colonies. Additionally, as the only violent decolonization process among
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the former French colonies to take thousands of lives, the Algerian Revolution left lasting scars
on the French populace and exacerbated negative perceptions of Islam as a threat to France.
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The relationship of violence that has come to define the French-Algerian situation began
44

with the invasion of Algiers by King Charles X in June of 1830. The French army decimated
the resident Ottoman armed forces, who at the time controlled the territory, and proceeded to
claim it as the newest French colony. This seizure of land was undertaken in large part as a
means to promote nationalism and patriotism at home through the expansion of French power
and influence.45 The initial campaign to capture Algiers lasted three-weeks, but the years would
bear witness to hundreds of thousands of deaths perpetrated by the invading French military. The
first forty years of French rule resulted in the deaths of more than 800,000 Algerians through
military actions alone.46 It is believed that nearly the same number also died as a result of
non-military intervention from the French and subsequent famines and droughts.47 During this
time, French colonizers experienced increased interaction with Arab Muslims and began forming
more concrete stereotypes of the people as a whole. Primarily, the French perceived the Muslims
48

they encountered to exhibit both a hostile nature, and an inherently lazy position on life.

Notably, the prescription of abnormal aggression and violence was derived from the acts of
barbarism experienced by French soldiers during the conquering of Algeria, as they reported
49

Muslim men engaging in horrific acts of mutilations and beheadings of their enemies.
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The French saw the conquest of Algeria much as any other European power would. It
was a territory to be taken for the glory of France, a target which would increase popular support
and boost prestige and and the economy. France further justified the colonization of Algeria
through claims of undertaking a “civilizing mission,” in an effort to bring culture and modernity
50

to the savages of the African continent. These justifications continue to bias French perception
of the period of colonialism, but that topic will be discussed further down in the paper.
During the initial invasion, France portrayed the leaders of Algeria as Islamic fanatics
51

and oriental despots. This permitted Europeans to better justify the conquest and the resulting
hundreds of thousands of deaths as a necessary toll for the spread of civilization and the
52

Christian faith to the backwards peoples of Algeria. This justification enabled European
colonizers to assure themselves of their own moral duty, even while torturing and killing the
native populations. This xenophobic sense of superiority existed long before the period of
colonialism, but the physical act of conquest and the following treatment of the natives cemented
the righteousness of the European position further throughout the colonial period.
The French were able to justify actions perpetrated against the Arab majority in large part
because of their internalized sense of morality and superiority. For the European colonizers,
Muslims represented an inherently fanatical and zealous population, whose beliefs and traditions
53

could never truly coexist with the various European models. For the French, this was
particularly prevalent going forward as the French ideals of liberte, egalite, and fraternite, as
well as their belief in secularism stood in contrast with the teachings of Islam.
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Part of the process of colonization included the rewriting of Algeria’s history to further
justify the presence of the French. One author, Robert Randau, overwrote the exotic history of
Algeria with depictions of pre-French Algeria as “characterized by utter squalor, infertile land,
54

filth, and piracy.” This rewriting of history continues to match with France’s tendency to define
their imperial conquests as a morally justified and mandated undertaking. While the massacre of
an indigenous peoples for economic gain would frame French Algeria as a patriotic political
move, the framing of the invasion and subsequent subjugation and oppression in terms of a
morally mandated mission civilisatrice is more desirable.55 This is significant, as that same
mission continues to play a role in the political definitions of French identity for those from the
conservative or extreme-right side of the political spectrum. The adherence to mission
civilicatrice also persists in the education of France’s youths, as demonstrated by the 2005 law
which mandated the teaching of France’s positive role in their colonial efforts in history classes
while ignoring the horrible actions taken.56
It is untrue to say that the Algerian Revolution represented a new and spontaneous
development in the history of Franco-Algerian relations. All throughout the history of French
Algeria, colons had seen the Muslim population as a threat to their safety. Following the
suppression of the Berbers in Constantine by French forces in 1871, the Algerian colonists
57

retaliated for the 2,686 settlers who were killed by the rebels. The following reparations and
seizures of land impoverished the Algerians of all backgrounds and resulted in widespread
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famine and poverty. By the 1930s dissent had begun to foment in serious quantity across
Algeria and calls for revolution began.
The Algerian War persisted from 1954 to 1962, and resulted in extensive casualties, with
59

reports ranging from 400,000 to 1.5 million casualties It was during the war that France became
exposed to another threat posed by Islam beyond the symbolic. The association of the acts of
terrorism, designed as a form of asymmetric warfare to counter France’s greater resources and
and military capability, introduced terroristic threat to the perceptions of Muslims.
Towards the end of the war, the rate of bombings increased substantially. These
bombings were carried carried out by both sides during the conflict, represented by the FLN for
Algeria the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète O
 AS for France, and the attacks occurred on both
60

sides of the mediterranean. In January and February alone, France experienced 111 bombings
61

while Algeria endured a further 555 just in the month of January. This heightened usage of
terrorist tactics and bombings strengthened French fears of Islamist fundamentalism in the
decades to follow, and this impact will be discussed to a greater extent in the next chapter.
When the war did come to an end with the Evian accords under the guidance of Charles
de Gaulle, who had been recalled to deal with the issue of the Algerian Revolution, many felt
betrayed that de Gaulle failed to do more to maintain the French empire. In particular, the
pieds-noirs saw this act as an abandonment by the French government.
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When the Arab revolutionaries regained power over Algeria, they demonstrated a failure
to differentiate between the Europeans and other non-Arabs such as the 100,000 plus Jewish
citizens of Algeria who were prevailed upon to leave the newly liberated state to much the same
degree as the descendants of France. Where France had initially believed that the French and
European settlers would be allowed to continue residing in Algeria following the end of the
empire, the violent actions perpetrated by the FLN and threats of continued violence against any
settlers who remained changed the situation. Instead of a small, steady influx of a couple
hundred thousand settlers over several years, France experienced a swarm of nearly one million
fleeing repatriates in the few months following liberation.
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Postcolonial France
The decolonization of French Algeria was a bloody affair, characterized primarily by
brutal violence and acts of terror on a scale beyond that exhibited by any other former French
colony. Both the Algerian Muslims and the European settlers in Algeria arguably had a right to
call Algeria home, as the settlers, while ethnically foreign, had made major contributions to the
63

success of Algeria through contributions to industry and healthcare among others. This fact
made the results of the war more crippling for the defeated French, as the settlers felt themselves
betrayed by both the Algerians and the French government who had failed to protect their right
to live in their homeland. In the postcolonial period the relationship between France and Islam
had already transformed from one of distrust to one of anger and fear. The casualties of the war
had exacerbated negative threat perceptions and cemented Islam as a source of violence and as a
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threat to French values. Following the war, Islamophobic sentiments pervaded the postcolonial
atmosphere as mostly white, Catholic French males engaged in the mistreatment of Muslim
migrants through socio-political actions and physical abuses. Finally, the influx of Muslim
migrants in postcolonial France served to heighten the perceived threats posed by Islam through
its increase in visibility to the French population.64 How visibility leads to fear reading

Changed Perception of Muslims in Postcolonial France
As discussed earlier, the years of colonialism had changed the French perception of
Muslims by forcing increased levels of interactions between the two groups. Even before the
revolution, the French had come to view Muslims as a symbolic threat to the French republican
ideology and had refused them citizenship until 1958, only a few years before the liberation of
65

Algeria. By the end of the revolution, the acts of terrorism perpetrated by the FLN and the
mounting casualties experienced by the French, both at home and abroad, had exacerbated the
already strained tensions between the two ideological groups.
While the French had always seen Jews, Muslims, and other Oriental factions as lesser,
the period of colonialism forced the French to recognize the unique differences and problems
posed by the integration of Muslims into French society. Having qualified Muslims as violent,
lazy, and hyper-religious to such a degree as to dub them incapable of assimilation into secular
French society, the French in the post-colonial era viewed Muslim immigrants as symbolic,
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realistic, and terroristic threats to French society. This hardening of the French attitude towards
Muslims paired with the psychological damage of losing their last, most integrated colony left
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the French feeling weak and afraid. This, coupled with the historically mounting fear and distrust
of the culturally and religiously repellant Muslims resulted in a French nation awash with
Islamophobic views.
It is because of the violence and fear that came to be associated with Muslims during the
Algerian Revolution and the early postcolonial era that France’s discussions on modern threats
of Islam have an embedded bias. “In France, the intellectual debates on the contemporary risks
of Islamic radicalization have as a result been enriched by an older engagement with the
67

Algerian situation.” Terrorism and threats to French republican ideals became the themes
associated with Muslims, and this has persisted to today. This phenomenon is not confined to
France either, as a recent study of eight European nations discovered that 50% of Europeans
68

interviewed believed that Islam is an intolerant faith. These perceptions of Islam, continue to
frame the debate on the risks of Islamification across Europe, and have done so for generations
The French perception of Islam as a source of terrorism emerged from the events that
transpired in the final days of the Revolution. “The Algerian Front de liberation nationale (FLN)
drew much of its rhetoric and motivation from Islam, and many French soon developed a
69

tremendous fear of (the) religion.” While the French had previously come to associate Algerian
Muslims with laziness, aggression, and zealotry, the added threat of terrorism did not truly
manifest in the French psyche until the extensive bombings of France and metropolitan Algeria
were carried out by the FLN. While this form of asymmetric warfare is common during the
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decolonization process, the religious dimension given to it by the Quranic teachings cast the
whole of Islam as intrinsically dangerous to the French: not only symbolically, but as a source of
terrorism as well.

Treatment of Muslims in Postcolonial France
The shift in psychological perceptions of Islam might well explain the perpetuation of
violence against Muslim migrants in postcolonial France. During the Algerian Revolution,
French police and citizens engaged in acts of violence and persecution against Algerian nationals
living in France. On October 17, 1961, nearly thirty thousand Algerian nationalists were
brutalized by the police of Paris when they came out to demonstrate in solidarity with Algeria’s
liberation.70 In the days following, estimates state that the police killed between thirty-one and
two hundred demonstrators for breaking the Parisian curfew and supporting Algerian liberation.71
Furthermore, to cover up the violent acts, all police and military were granted amnesty for all
war crimes in 1968.72 While mass killings of Algerians did not continue into postcolonial France,
acts of violence and aggression persisted through various forms of violent politicized actions.
One example of this perpetuated bad blood between the hereditary French and the
Muslim migrants was the periodic violent summers which occurred throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s. These “murderous summers” referred to the gathering of groups of French citizens,
73

usually white catholic males, to assault Algerian Muslim immigrant workers. “In sport-like
fashion, a group of white beaufs would set upon the raton (rat), and beat him up, destroy his
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identity papers or payslips (thus making his stay in France illegitimate), and leave him for dead.”
74

This form of Islamophobic lynching, while violent, was itself the manifestation of the police

brutality and murder experienced legally during the Algerian Revolution.
After the end of these violent summers, a new more symbolic form of persecution gained
prevalence among older white Frenchmen. The prey in these situations being young ‘immigrant’
children, regardless of whether they were indeed immigrants or just looked to be so. “The
children were shot at, sniper-style, by (mostly elderly white male) neighbours from their
apartment windows.”75 This violent hazing fostered a particularly sinister symbolic meaning as
the shooting of children symbolized a deeper exclusion from French nationhood.76 The 1980s
also saw the increasing use of unnecessary force carried out by French police against Muslim
inhabitants of the banlieues. 77 This trait of unwarranted brutality perpetrated against Muslim
immigrants has persisted through to today, as will be examined in chapter three.

Extensive Repatriation of Settlers (Pieds-Noirs)
For those descended from French colonizers, the revolt of the Muslim majority
represented an attack on their legacy. For these pieds-noirs, the colonization of Algeria had been
an action of benevolence, designed to bring civilization to the barbarians and savages through the
78

introduction of Christianity, infrastructure, ethics, and culture. Even to this day, the French
population has difficulty regarding their period of imperial rule in negative terms, preferring to
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focus on the benefits that they believe they brought to the Algerian people. For them, the
Algerian Revolution represented a betrayal of their good works, and signified proof that Islam
could not coexist with French republican ideals. For the pieds-noirs, to be forced back to the
mainland away from their familial homes was an affront to the legitimacy of their colonial
mission and their inherent racial superiority.
The primary demographic fallout from the liberation of Algeria was the subsequent
80

forced repatriation of around 1 million pieds-noirs by the French government. This large and
costly relocation sprouted from continued threats to the livelihoods and safety of those
pieds-noirs still remaining in Algeria brought on by the rise of the previously oppressed Muslim
81

majority. After returning to mainland France, the pieds-noirs repatriates were treated with a
certain amount of disdain. French public opinion had begun to sour towards the actions of the
Algerian French during the events of the Algerian Revolution and the sudden repatriation of
these descendents of French heritage was greeted cooly by the skeptical French public. For many
including the presiding government, the repatriated pieds-noirs represented not only a black
mark on the history of French social republicanism, but also a threatening increase in
competition for jobs.
For some of the French, the pieds-noirs were demonized as the antagonists of the
Algerian Revolution. Much in the same manner that France attempted to remove blame from
themselves concerning their participation in the Vichy Regime, the New Left in France placed
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the blame for all offenses of torture and abuses of Algerians on the returning pieds-noirs,
labeling them as fascists and unworthy of being French, “like all people from Algeria.”82
The post-colonial period of the 70s and 80s was characterized by brutal. Extrajudicial
actions taken against Algerian and Muslim immigrants on the basis of their ethnicity and
religion. These actions perpetuated the sense of French superiority, while adding to the division
between the two cultures. It is on this history that the FN bases its legitimacy as a defender of the
French people from the violent and intrusive ‘other,’ the Muslims.

Le Front National and Postcolonial Islamophobia
How can it be said that the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have provided
fuel for populist rhetoric in the twenty-first century? Having shown that postcolonial France was
rife with Islamophobic sentiments, how has populist rhetoric capitalized on this fear to push
forward far-right, anti-immigrant policies in the 21st century? Populism, as previously discussed,
rises from fears that the established government is failing to look out for the physical and
economic security of its people. Support for populism often focuses on support for platforms of
hyper-nationalism, anti-immigration practices, and identification of a ‘true’ national identity
83

which presents voters with a designated dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ It follows that a
population is more susceptible to the allure of populism when their identity has close ties to
sentiments of xenophobia and self-aggrandizement or in the case of the French, exceptionalisme.
Exceptionalisme is the French belief that their ideals of liberte, egalite, and fraternite, as well as
their staunch adherence to secularism, all have universal value among the French and anyone
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trying to become French must merit it through the complete acceptance of these values. In the
postcolonial period following the Algerian Revolution, the physical entry of pieds-noirs coupled
with the psychological change in French perception of their place in the international community
both contributed to the creation and rise of the FN. More importantly, the resulting cultural
acceptance of the antagonism between republicanism and Islam continues to serve as a validation
for the FN.
Following the Second World War, France was a hostile environment for far-right
political sentiment. Their efforts to expunge residual memories and guilt from the legacy of the
Vichy regime made it nearly impossible for any extremist far-right political candidates or
84

organizations to gain traction. The turning point for this rhetoric came with the Algerian
Revolution; the violence and terrorism enacted by the Muslim population both in Algeria and in
France rekindled the lights of populist sentiment in France. The 1950s saw the renewed presence
of extreme-right organizations in politics whose primary talking point was the need to maintain
85

control of French Algeria. Beyond the political spectrum, the events of the Algerian revolution
prompted the creation of secret organizations such as the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète
(OAS), a paramilitary group which engaged in violent acts of retribution and terrorism against
Algerian nationals and Muslims throughout and after the war.
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Demographic Change as benefit to Populist Movements
The influx of Muslim workers was not the only mass immigration experienced by France
in the years following Algerian liberation. The hundreds of thousands of repatriated pieds-noirs
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had also arrived in France in 1962 and they too met with ostracization and social reprisals by the
natural-born French. On returning to France, the pieds-noirs were seen not as French natives
returning home, but as immigrants from a failed colonial period who were responsible for
atrocities enacted against the Algerian natives. Pushed to the sidelines of society, they saw their
return as a failure of the French government to look out for their rights and livelihoods. For
87

them, it was an opportunity lost.

The returned settlers had been designated under the general banner of immigrant
following their forced departure from Algeria. For them, this title ignored their cultural heritage
and lumped them in together with the Muslims who had forced them to abandon the world they
had settled and come to know as home. Not sure what the theory is but, individuals who find
themselves as partially members of a nation will often engage in hyper nationalistic behavior to
prove to others their validity as a national. For the returning colonizers, this manifested in a focus
88

on French identity based on culture rather than on political definitions. For them, there was and
continues to be a difference between those whose heritage is ‘true’ French, and the immigrants
from abroad, particularly those of Arab descent.
Unlike the Muslim immigrants, the pieds-noirs were not condemned by the Front
National as non-French immigrants, come to change the French way of life. Instead, Jean-Marie
Le Pen and his party embraced the returned settlers on the grounds of national identity being
decided not by the place of one’s immediate birth or one’s processing through the legal system,
but on one’s adherence to French cultural ideology.
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The Islamophobia experienced by the pied-noirs in their flight from their homeland in
Algeria predisposed them to the anti-immigration rhetoric which denounced Muslims as a virus
upon France. While other members of the French bureaucracy had generalized the returning
settlers in the same position as all other immigrants, the FN had supported them and validated
their French cultural identity. It is no wonder that the FN has continued to draw much of its
support from the families of the repatriated French citizens in the decades following. As pointer
out by Daniel Stockemer:
“Although it is no longer the primary socialization mechanism, about 25 % of my
interviewees were socialized by parents who embraced radical right-wing thoughts and
ideologies. These individuals have a traditional FN background. They are descendants of
former Algerian colonizers, come from a traditional Catholic milieu, and/or have parents
89
that were active in the FN or another radical or extreme-right-wing group.”
The pieds-noirs and their descendents have consistently constituted a strong base for the far-right
populist party since its formation. This is primarily a result of the desire of the repatriated
citizens to be considered French once more, as opposed to being seen as ‘others’ by members of
what they see as their own people and culture. The FN provides pieds-noirs with a political
outlet that supports their perceptions of French ethno-cultural identity as the primary determinant
of national identity and gives them a voice against the establishment of the government which
cost them their familial homes in Algeria.

Cultural Validity for the Extreme Right
Perhaps the most important implications of the rise of Islamophobic sentiments in
postcolonial France concerning the FN is the capability the FN has gained in normalizing their
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mantra. By virtue of being a far-right, populist party, the FN would normally continue to exist on
the fringes of the political process, seen more as an annoying product of disgruntlement among
the unemployed and those who believe their government fails to work for them. However,
because France’s xenophobic sentiments are based not on fully irrational fears which occur on a
case-by-case basis, but on a history of violence, terrorism, and repeated interactions, the threats
of violence and Islamification which are used in the rhetoric of the FN hold broader credibility.
The longstanding fears of Islam allow politicians like Marine Le Pen to characterize her
comments and her calls to action not as Islamophobic, but as republican. France’s willingness to
accept that Muslims represent numerous forms of threats to the French way of life, enables
populist politics to become a more legitimate defense not of extreme-right policies, but of French
republican values.

Conclusion
A nation which has experienced the power of being an imperial colonizer, and has
proceeded to lose that power through the violent process of decolonization is more susceptible to
the rise of populist movements because of the resulting xenophobia vis-a-vis their former
subjects. In the case of France and her colonies, and her relationship with Algeria in particular,
this xenophobic-backed populism is very potent due to the numerous threats seen to be posed by
Islamic culture concerning French republican values.
More than just xenophobia, the French populace has experienced a very real sense of
betrayal derived from the actions of the Muslim revolutionaries during the Algerian Revolution.
The acts of terror perpetrated by the oppressed natives of the colony planted a specific sense of
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xenophobia in the hearts of the French people thanks to the their actions being influenced by the
teachings of Islam. The colonization and decolonization of Algeria instilled in the French a sense
of ‘otherness’ concerning Muslims and believers in Islam. This Islamophobia, spread through as
sense of self-pity, cemented by the arrival of the embittered pieds-noirs, and perpetuated by the
denial of French-directed atrocities against their former colonial subjects, has changed the
French psyche. This change will be examined further in future chapters concerning the passing
of legislation banning physical representations of Islam in public.
France’s colonial history and her continued belief in the importance of her republican
values and secular identity have predisposed her to being the perfect target for xenophobic
populist rhetoric. The following rise of the Front National as a prominent and established party in
the years following the liberation of Algeria, while certainly due to a multitude of factors, is a
demonstration of the impact that Islamophobia has on the political system in France. The
Algerian Revolution reintroduced far-right sentiments into French politics, and the violent
interactions and terrorism of the period established a firm perceived threat posed by Muslims and
their faith to French. The FN gained significant ground in the following years by capitalizing off
of the Islamophobic sentiments left over from colonial times. More importantly, the FN has
consistently utilized France’s commitments to secularism and universalism as validation for
anti-Muslim rhetoric by claiming that they are acting for the betterment of all French. However,
their definition of ‘all French’ remains exclusive and ethnocentric. Going forward, this paper will
demonstrate how, while other events and circumstances have exacerbated the sentiments of
Islamophobia and resulted in increased support for the FN, the sentiments themselves have long
been a part of French identity.
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The Exacerbation of French Islamophobia: Terrorism in France
Forward
The acts of terrorism which have plagued France in the twenty-first century provide significant
evidence for the link between rising Islamophobic sentiments and increased support for
populism. Terrorism promotes populism in France for four reasons. First, terrorism incites
emotional reactions of fear and anger. In doing so, terrorism increases political participation,
particularly among individuals who previously were inactive in the political sphere. Second,
constituents and politicians gravitate towards right-wing authoritarian policies post-terror,
sacrificing civil liberties for more authoritarian security.90 Third, France’s pre-existing fears of
Islam and the supposed incompatibility between French cultural identity and the cultural
teachings of Islam contextualizes terrorism in cultural-political dimensions. Fourth, the political
reactions to acts of terrorism serve to further legitimize the Front National platform by targeting
Muslims as a single group. These four functions of terrorism support the rising power and
influence of the FN in France.

Introduction
On January 7, 2015, two men arrived at the Paris office building of Charlie Hebdo, a
satirical magazine outlet known for distributing derogatory comics and images debasing the
religion of Islam and the prophet Muhammed. There, Said Kouachi and his brother Cherif
Kouachi entered the establishment with Kalashnikov rifles and murdered 12 people. The next
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day a policewoman is killed. The day after that, a man named Amedy Coulibaly took several
hostages in a Jewish supermarket, killing four of them. All four perpetrators are killed in
shootouts with French police. All four of the attackers were associated with al-Qaeda, and their
91

actions were lauded by the Islamic state known as ISIS. After leaving the ruined offices of
Charlie Hebdo, the Kouachi brothers were captured on an amateur recording, saying that they
had avenged the Prophet Muhammed.
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It was the first instance of coordinated terrorism on French soil in twenty years, and it
would begin a new period of terror in France. Later that same year, France experienced a loss of
life “not witnessed since the end of the Second World War,” when the November Paris Attacks
93

resulted in 130 deaths and over 400 injuries. Two years later, Presidential candidate Marine Le
Pen succeeded in garnering one-third of the vote as a fringe-party, right-wing extremist
candidate. What is the connection between the advent of terrorism and the rise of populist
support? Has the increase in acts of terror by Muslim Fundamentalists caused the increased
support for populist leaders and changed people’s hearts? Or were the conditions and sentiments
already there and the attacks only exacerbated them? This chapter will seek to answer these
questions through a targeted analysis of the major terror attacks of the 21st century using existing
theory on the impact of fear, anxiety, and anger on the people’s ideologies and actions, and the
political results following acts of terror.
This chapter will begin by defining terrorism through its causes and justifications, before
reviewing existing literature on the psychological and political fallout of terrorism. Next follows

Lawrence Davidson, “Who Is Charlie?” Middle East Policy 23, no. 1, (2016): 170.
Eva Polonska-Kimunguyi and Marie Gillespie, “Terrorism discourse on French international broadcasting: France
24 and the case of Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris,” European Journal of Communication 3, no. 5 (2016): 574.
93
Gino G. Raymond, “After Charlie : The Unravelling of the French Republican Response,” Patterns of Prejudice
52, no. 1 (2018): 26.
91
92

47

an overview of the three major acts of terrorism faced by France during the 21st century, namely
the Charlie Hebdo shootings, the November Paris Attacks, and the Bastille Day truck massacre
in Nice. This section will review the events of the attacks, their context, and the immediate
public reactions. It shall evaluate how the impacts of terrorism extended beyond physical damage
to determine how terrorism has impacted France socially and politically. Shifts towards
right-wing “authoritarian policies at the expense of civil liberties,” loss of faith in established
regimes, “support of high-risk aggressive political actions,” and lowering of tolerance for
94

perceived “out-groups and ideological rivals,” are some examples of this fallout. Additionally,
these case studies will examine the actions taken by the media and the government in framing the
attacks and the significance of their actions. Finally, this chapter shall conclude by looking at
how this surge in terrorism has been used by the Front National to spread their influence and
give their movement legitimacy.

What is Terrorism?
From the shootings at the Charlie Hebdo magazine to the November attacks to the
tragedy in Nice, all of these attacks fell within the definition of terrorism. One proposed
argument is that terrorism is a “manifestation of political violence that is distinct from other
95

types of violence, such as organized crime, mass civil conflict, riots or uprisings.” The primary
purpose of such premeditated attacks is the creation of a “climate of extreme fear” through which
96

a terrorist can address a wider audience with their political and/or ideological statements. It is
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through the spread of these targeted messages and the spread of terror that a single individual or
group can garner an entire nation’s attention.
The act of terrorism is a heavily politicized one, designed to shock the public and bring
about change through violent acts. Sylvain Brouard presents a French interpretation of terrorism
in his article on the political responses to the 2015 and 2016 terror attacks in France. He defines
terrorism as “a systematic campaign of indiscriminate violence against public civilian targets to
97

influence a wider audience.” Terrorists commit acts of violence to spread fear and political
unrest throughout a nation. In some cases, terrorism is born from a domestic impetus, where
disgruntled citizens resort to violence for reasons of securing political change in their own
government. However, in the French case, while the perpetrators have originated in France as
citizens, the overarching discourse on contemporary terrorism depicts the attacks not as domestic
disgruntlement, but as an imported hatred and extremism from Islamism abroad. This presents
another issue, as it overlooks the failure of the French government to effectively integrate
Muslim immigrants into French society, placing the blame firmly on Islamist fundamentalism,
but this topic will be addressed in full later on in this paper.
These violent demonstrations can physically manifest in many diverse ways including the
taking of hostages, the blowing-up of an important building or landmark, or the indiscriminate
shooting of an unarmed population. What matters when defining and understanding terrorism is
that the perpetrators have a political objective for which they are not only willing but eager to
target civilians with deadly force. The results of this are at best, the elimination of the aggressors
by law-enforcement, and at worst, the deaths of any number of people and possibly the
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destruction of commercial, political, or cultural edifices. While the initial strike of terrorism is
often what is focused on in the media and later on in history books, it is the fallout of the attack
which is most important to the analysis of terror’s political impacts.

Emotional Reactions to Terrorism and their Political Implications
Existing literature on terrorism has determined that there are several common emotional
reactions which follow a successful act of terror on a mass scale. These emotions and their
impacts on following actions can change in severity depending on the violence and shock of the
situation as well as on the previously existing conditions. Most importantly, the way in which
media portrays an act of terror plays a significant role in the reactions of those affected by the
fear of terrorism. Acts of terror create widespread sentiments of fear and anger in the targeted
population. These psychological reactions to terror impact not only the amount of time and effort
spent participating in political functions, but also the views one has concerning party affiliation
values, particularly security. Individuals who feel threatened by acts of terror have historically
demonstrated shifts in political views, tending to lean further to the right on policy issues of
security.98 And all of these reactions are heightened by the work of the news media following an
attack as media outlets are wont to reinforce personal political agendas with biased wording,
visuals, and reporting.
According to Pavlos Vasilopoulos, an associate researcher at the Centre de Researches
Politiques, there are two primary psychological reactions following acts of terrorism; fear and
99

anger. In both cases, the subject experiencing said emotion is faced with a situation that is alien
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to them; one that disrupts their “desired condition.”

Additionally, the spread of either of these

emotional states coupled with “exposure to violence tends to increase political participation.”

101

However, fear and anger manifest in significantly different ways on the political spectrum as will
be demonstrated later using empirical data collected before and after the Charlie Hebdo
Shootings and the November ‘15 Paris attacks.

Fear: Increased Seeking for Threatening Information
The initial reaction following acts of terror is often one of increased anxiety and fear.
Anxiety arises in situations where the public is subjected to a situation they perceive as
threatening, specifically in a matter that they feel is out of their control.102 Following a violent
event lying outside of ordinary conditions, witnesses to violence experience fear that their
security is not being upheld. This fear often translates into a breakdown of trust for their
government, upon whom the public relies to provide for their safety.103 This breakdown of trust
only occurs for a government who is seen as incapable of addressing the source of the anxiety. A
capable government that presented itself as capable of handling the situation would instead
receive an increase in public trust.104
Existing literature shows that “fear enhances the political information-seeking process,”
particularly among individuals who previously have refrained from engaging in any significant
105

political participation.
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Fear itself is the feeling of helplessness in the face of threatening

Ibid, 105.
Ibid, 103.
102
Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian, Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening
World (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 8.
103
Ibid, 2.
104
Ibid, 75.
105
Vasilopoulos, 103.
101

51

conditions, making it natural for humans to seek out additional information to better prepare
themselves to cope with the threatening situations.106 Unfortunately, the types of information
pursued by individuals driven by extraordinary anxiety are often of a biased nature which can
negatively impact the knowledge obtained.107 “Individuals… will concentrate on threatening
information because this information may seem more relevant to avoiding future harms and thus
potentially reducing anxiety than positive information.”108 In the days following acts of terror,
this inclination to seek out threatening information can prove damaging to the processing of facts
as terrorism transforms from an unframed disaster to a politicized phenomenon. Particularly as
the media has demonstrated itself to be inherently biased against Muslims in the reporting on
terrorism.109
Affective Intelligence theory states that citizens alternate between two types of political
decision-making strategies depending on their external environment. In times of peace and
stability, people rely on habit, following practices that maximize their usage of time. However,
when placed in dangerous or threatening situations, individuals transform into attentive voters
110

because their anxiety enhances political interest and the desire to learn more.

One byproduct of

this newfound desire to be informed is the increased capacity to reject established ideologies in
111

favor of “contemporary assessments of their political environment.

One issue with the increased following of news on tv following acts of terrorism is that,
while more information is collected and political involvement increases, those individuals who
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previously lacked political sophistication have trouble discerning between objective reporting
and media with an agenda. The media consumed following the terrorist attacks in 2015 tended to
export certain unfounded biases and generalizations Despite the fact that the majority of the
terrorist attacks experienced by France have been committed by French citizens, France 24, the
French international broadcaster, portrayed the shootings on January 7th as “an external
phenomenon coming to France from outside,” and as such bought into the larger discourse on
112

terrorism in the western world.

Anger: Increased Willingness to Participate in Political Functions
Following the onset of fear, public opinion becomes influenced to a greater degree by the
influx of news media concerning the event. The media, in turn, delivers a target at which the
public can direct their emotions and begin to reacquire the sense of control. By introducing a
subject for the public to view as the reason for the change in desired conditions, the news media
changes the psychological stimulus presented to the public and introduces anger as a second
widespread psychological disposition. While fear spreads in reaction to unfamiliar situations that
are uncontrollable to the individual, anger “arises when “one’s existing desired condition is
disrupted, often by intentional actions of an identified other, and when the individual feels
113

confident in their resources to attack the blame target.”

It is the existence of this identified

‘other’ which allows feelings of concern and fear to be channeled and redirected into action. It is
through anger that a terrorized populace discovers the drive to strike back against the supposed
perpetrators of the central harmful event.
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Where the fearful act under the perception that they cannot control their altered
conditions, the allure of anger lies in that it provides the individual “a sense of control over the
114

threatening stimulus.”

Following the Charlie Hebdo shootings, 67% of survey French citizens
115

reported feelings of anger in response to the disruption of their peaceful society.

It is therefore

understandable that the public response, where 6% of the French population took to the streets to
demonstrate, achieved its unheard of rates of participation.116 Anger is enticing when compared
to fear as it represents the retaking of control from external forces. Having someone to blame for
the negative changes in one’s environment, whether the changes come in the form of
unemployment or a nearby shooting, is a choice many will make to escape the the lack of control
felt while suffering under fear.

Shifts in Political Views
Following the immediate psychological changes spread by acts of terror, there is often a
shift in political ideological positions towards a more authoritarian right-wing policies
concerning matters of security. Feelings of anxiety often push individuals to search out authority
figures on the matter in question. Oftentimes, one political party or partisan wing controls a
certain policy more than the other. Traditionally speaking, issues of terrorism, security, and
immigration have been framed as major issues and focuses of far-right political parties.117
When seeking to improve safety after increased awareness of risk, individuals are often
willing to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for authoritarian security measures. This is
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particularly true if the civil liberty restrictions target a specific perceived out-group in the
community which has been framed as a scapegoat.118 This comes from the desire of individuals
to gain control over their situation through improved understanding of the issue. However, the
willingness to accept elite and media opinions as fact can allow for framing of an accident
beyond is actual parameters. This leads to the manipulation of the public for personal interest.119
Had the terrorist attacks in France not been framed as direct results of Islam, the events likely
would have been seen as the actions of a few disgruntled individuals, rather than as a symptom
of Islam and Muslim presence in France.
Having examined the existing literature on the impacts of terrorism on popular emotions,
political participation, and policy preferences, it is now time to return the case of terrorism in
France. The following case analyses will examine the major terror events of 2015 and 2016 and
demonstrate how their existence catalyzed support for the FN’s populist, anti-immigrant rhetoric,
and how terrorism made French politicians more likely to adopt far-right policies pertaining to
security due to perceived popular demand.

Case Studies of the Reactions to Terrorism
When discussing modern terrorism in France there are three events which warrant
evaluation and analysis. The Charlie Hebdo Shootings, the November Paris Attacks, and the
Truck Massacre in Nice are uniquely memorable for their violence, shock, and sheer magnitude.
They also support existing theory as 46% of French citizens polled expressed feeling fear
following the Charlie Hebdo shootings.
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Following the November attacks, similar results were
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reported in the form of heightened levels of fear and anger.

Understanding the responses to

these events and the trends following them is crucial to understanding how the Front National
capitalized off of terror-induced Islamophobia.

Charlie Hebdo Shootings (January 7-9, 2015)
As addressed at the beginning of the chapter, the Charlie Hebdo shootings and
subsequent killings on January 8 and 9 left 17 French citizens dead before French police
managed to hunt down and kill the perpetrators. The Kouachi brothers and Amedy Coulibaly had
previously planned this attack out in large part as an act of revenge for the offensive anti-Muslim
material that Charlie Hebdo was known for.122 The shootings at the Charlie Hebdo office marked
the first act of coordinated terrorism on French soil in twenty years. This event shocked France
out of its relative complacency as the most secure western democracy and reopened political
discourse on the presumed security of the nation. The attack along with the subsequent police
and hostage killings over the next two days shook the nation and aggravated tensions between
the large Muslim minority and the non-Muslim French population.
Following this initial act of terror, “between 3 and 4 million demonstrators, about 6
percent of the French population” took to the streets on January 11th holding signs with what has
123

become the iconic message “Je Suis Charlie,” I am Charlie.

The demonstration was the largest

in France’s history and portrayed an image of a united republic to the world. The political
response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings was one of support for the demonstrations, engaging in
a rallying behind the ‘Je Suis Charlie’ banner and declaring the attack an assault on all that
121
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France holds dearest: their liberte, egaliter, and fraternite.

Emmanuel Todd, a professor,

historian, and sociologist at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris came forth
after the demonstrations suggesting that the government was responsible for creating an
environment “where everyone who was a true French citizen had to identify with the January 7
victims, as well as the alleged ‘free speech’ behavior that drew their attackers to them.”

125

This

message of uniformity and republican values forced upon the Muslim population living in France
a terrible choice between supporting their faith and their various national and ethnic identities or
agreeing with the validity of the free speech advocated for by Charlie Hebdo.
The Muslim extremists responsible for this shooting were quickly reported to be
associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS.

126

Because of these affiliations and the widely televised

footage of the killers claiming the attack for the glory of the Prophet Muhammed, French media
portrayal of the terrorist event exhibited the same biases shown by the United States after
September 11. Rather than focusing on the specific reasons motivating the individuals who had
perpetrated the acts, French media like their international broadcasting network, France 24
generalized the source of the violence. France 24 was quick to report to the public that the attack
had been made by defenders of Islam.127 In addition, the media introduced further uncertainty
and fear by noting the links between the terrorists and the banlieues of Paris which had long
128

since been a sanctuary for the segregated Muslim poor.
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Charlie Hebdo had until the attack been known for its crude and defiling cartoons
129

mocking French minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews.

The cartoons focused greatly on

the prophet Muhammed; placing him in unorthodox and crude situations designed to mock the
Islamic faith and undermine their religious messiah. The magazine had previously received
multiple lawsuits back in 2012 from Islamic organizations asking for the removal of offensive
and derogatory depictions of their faith and had been under police-protection following a series
130

of threats made the year before the attack.

While a violent response is obviously to be condemned, the reality remains that the
Charlie Hebdo shootings were in response to a direct insult to the perpetrators’ faith and cultural
heritage. Perhaps this is why, when so many were taking to the streets in support of Charlie,
Muslim students in the public education system began speaking out that they did not support this
131

particular show of solidarity.

The failure of Muslim students in the French public education

system to observe the minute of silence on behalf of the victims of the shootings became a major
issue in the political discourse at the time.132 This failure to support the victims, as it was framed
by the media, was seen as a rejection of the French republican values of freedom of speech,
rather than a refusal to support Islamophobic proponents.
Following the initial demonstrations, the socialist government under Francois Hollande
increased their funding and support for national security.133 Despite the fact that Hollande was a
socialist president whose personal beliefs stemmed mostly from his commitment to liberalism, in
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the events following Charlie Hebdo, he disparaged the Muslim community as a threat to
republican values.134 This shift towards right-wing politics and anti-Muslim rhetoric would
become a feature of the later years of Hollande’s presidency through his handling of future terror
events.
The revival of terrorism in France also incurred violent retaliation from the French
public. “Whereas 2014 saw 133 reported (anti-Muslim) hate crimes, there were more than 400
such bias incidents in 2015. Per the French National Human Rights Commission (CNCDH), this
represented a 223 percent increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes.”135 Just as anger can incentivize
individuals to increase their visible participation in political functions, it is likely the increased
feelings of anger led to increased rates of violence. This increase in aggression towards Muslims
throughout France also signalled to politicians the rising tide of fear and the possibilities of
co-opting this fear of Islamic terrorism for political power. More generally, the return of
terrorism revived the perceived terroristic threats that had been attributed to Islam since the
Algerian Revolution.

The November Paris Attacks (November 13, 2015)
While the shootings of Charlie Hebdo left a lasting scar on the people of France, that
same year gave witness to the greatest death toll from terrorism than during any individual
136

month in their history.

The November Paris attacks were a series of coordinated acts of

brutality that took place on November 13, 2015, resulting in 130 deaths and over 400 additional
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injuries, of which 100 were reported to be serious in nature.137 These attacks were the deadliest
experienced by France since the Second World War and opened the door for valid criticism of
the administration’s inability to provide for the security of the French people.
Where the Charlie Hebdo shootings had been in response to a clear and repeated
provocation, mocking the foundations of the Islamic faith, the November attacks were different.
No specified ideological reasoning came to light following the attack, no insult issued against the
prophet Muhammed, nor any shared hatred of Islam between the victims. What little analysis
does exist on the reasoning behind the attack on November 13th, 2015 seems to agree that these
attacks, perpetrated by fundamentalists with ties to Daesh, were initiated with the purpose of
138

spreading fear and uncertainty across all of France.

Despite the November Paris attacks resulting in a significantly higher loss of life, the
impact on the French populace could be said to be comparable to the reactions to the Charlie
Hebdo shootings. It is likely that the relatively muted outrage was a result of the atack being less
shocking in the wake of the January attacks. This is not to say that Charlie Hebdo had inoculated
the French population against the emotional distress derived from acts of terrorism.
One of the most significant developments to come from the November attacks was the
response to the call for increased security given by President Francois Hollande. Three days after
the attack, Hollande met with the Houses of Parliament to suggest the initiation of a State of
Emergency. “(This) expanded executive and police powers with minimal judicial oversight.”139
The results of these unsupervised increases to police power and decreases to civil liberties has
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resulted in a substantial increase in reported acts of anti-Islamic discrimination.140 Hollande also
proposed changes that would permit the government to deprive naturalized individuals of their
citizenship if they became suspected of aiding or abetting acts of terrorism.141

The Car Massacre in Nice (July 14, 2016)
While other acts of terror have been committed in France since the November Paris
attacks, there is only one other instance in which terrorism truly shook the nation and recalled
into question the ability of the government to protect its citizens. On Bastille Day, July 14, 2016,
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian resident of France drove a cargo truck into a crowd
142

celebrating on the streets of Nice killing 86 people and injuring over 400 more.

This act of

terror happened months after the November Paris attacks and was taken by many as a sign that
the State of Emergency issued by President Francois Hollande that same month had failed to
effectively deter terrorism.
Unfortunately, the Nice attack has not received nearly as much coverage and analysis in
terms of the media’s portrayal of the events as the 2015 attacks received. However, the attack
quickly became framed as a direct attack on France’s universal values of equality, being that it
was perpetuated on Bastille Day, a celebration of French republicanism.143
The Nice attack could be considered as the third strike of Hollande’s government. When
Charlie Hebdo occurred, the general consensus was that it was an awful event which warranted
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an increase in focus on security. With November, critics of the government, especially members
of the FN opened up harsh criticism against the government for failing to make the necessary
changes to their security policy to prevent tragedy from occurring a second time. Nice presented
for many individuals a final straw effect. Notably, many regional governments, regardless of
political affiliation, took it upon themselves to enact local security measures against what they
proposed was a threat to French national security. More specifically in the months following the
2016 attack, regional governments from Marseilles to Pas-de-Calais passed legislation banning
the wearing of burkinis on public beaches.144
The burkini bans which spread across France in the aftermath of the massacre were
proposed as a mitigating factor concerning Islamist extremism on the beach. Including the hijab,
jilbab, burqa, and niqab, the burkini brings the total number of Muslim female garments
outlawed to some degree by France and her regions.145 In practice, the bans saw the advent of
French police going from beach to beach forcing Muslim women to remove their swimwear or
pay a fine for disobeying a law specifically targeting their religious expression in a country built
on ideals of tolerance.146

Framing Reactions to Terrorism in terms of existing Islamophobic Tensions
While the Muslim population was targeted to a greater extent following the acts of terror
and distrust did grow between practitioners of Islam and most others in France, this cultural
divide is not strictly a product of modern terrorism. France’s difficulties with Islam are not
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contemporary developments. Going back before the terrorist actions of the Algerian National
Liberation Front during their attempted revolution, France had already nurtured an ingrained fear
and uncertainty for the Muslim population brought to their shores through work or asylum.
France has also been home to one of the greatest populations of Muslims in Europe thanks to
147

their colonial links to Africa.

This has proven uniquely difficult for the French, as their staunch

belief in secularity naturally conflicts with the Muslim population adherence to Islam. This
conflict, both political and religious in nature depending on the event has bubbled over into
outright violence on several occasions over the 20th century including the bombing of a train in
Paris back in 1995 by Algerian terrorist who openly expressed having drawn inspiration from the
teachings of Islam.
Perhaps the most significant pre-existing condition in France concerning the treatment
and framing of the 2015 terror attacks was the historical deep-seated distrust and animosity that
many French citizens held for the ostracized and separated Islamic population in the banlieues
surrounding all major French cities. The divide between the French cultural values and those of
Islam has manifested itself in political avenues as well with the passage of the “law of 2004 on
‘conspicuous signs of religious identity,’ which forbade girls from wearing the Islamic headscarf
148

in public educational institutions.”

It was this ban which truly brought the Islamophobia in

France forth as a global issue. Legal practices continued to target Islamic citizens and migrants
through means such as the refusal of naturalization, the prohibition of garments deemed unfit for
French society, and the targeting of Muslim populations as a scapegoat for economic issues,
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perpetrated in large part by Le Front National.

149

Long before Charlie Hebdo, the French Judicial

System was already biased against those they perceived as opponents to the French way of life,
namely the Islamic Muslim minority.
In a related issue, the significant Muslim population in France has for the most part been
segregated from other French citizens geographically with the creation and perpetuation of the
banlieues surrounding most of her major cities. These “badlands of the Republic” as they were
referred to by the French media following the terrorist attacks in 2015, had been established
around Paris as a fallout from the influx of Muslim workers brought in from Northern Africa to
150

help rebuild France following WWII.

Since then these areas, originally designed as temporary

residences for the workers in the mid 20th century have devolved into Muslim-heavy slums
known for their poor living conditions and heightened rates of violence and poverty.
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One final issue to consider before returning to the concept of terrorism is that, before
Charlie Hebdo was attacked, France had not experienced an act of coordinated terrorism of such
violence and magnitude since 1995, 20 years earlier, when an Algerian terrorist syndicate
bombed a train under Paris. While this is less significant in understanding why Muslims were
targeted going forward, it is important from a psychological standpoint. Individuals who find
their previously assumed notions about reality to be false tend to react with anxiety and anger.

Analysis of France’s Reactions to Terror
Long before the Charlie Hebdo shootings, former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls
had put forth the reality that “social segregation was… undeniably visible in certain parts of
149
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France.”

The introduction of fear and anger into France’s political climate has been seen to

shift previous political leanings towards the right from pre-terror positions. Voters who in times
of peace and security felt safe in supporting politicians based on their economic and social
outlooks, or even on their party loyalties. However, once the security of peace is disturbed by
acts of violence lying outside their preexisting desired conditions, individuals alter their priorities
away from economic and social prosperity and exhibit a tendency to support increasingly
153

militaristic and authoritarian policies.

Political leaders are no exception to this trend of drifting towards the “illiberal right” as
demonstrated by France’s former president, Francois Hollande, following the November of 2015
Paris attacks.
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Hollande instituted a state of emergency in France in order to conduct searches

of property without warrants. Even as a socialist president, he enacted policies in response to the
acts of terror that would in other circumstances be “evocative of far-right politics” because it was
155

those policies that a fearful public begged for to ease their minds.

France is certainly not the only nation to have been affected on a national scale by the
advent of modern terrorism. Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the United
States was shaken to its core as millions tuned in to the political affairs of their nation believing
that their security was in danger and their government was incapable of providing answers. It is
the response of then-President George W. Bush that illustrates one significant generalization that
continues to this day to be an issue for the proper treatment of the threat of terrorism.
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Rather than identifying the responsible party and providing proper distinctions between
militant Islamism and Islam as a faith and Muslims and Islam generally, Bush initiated the War
on Terror, which unintentionally framed all of Islam as a monolithic, radical threat of terrorism
156

to the democratic West.

This generalization of Islam has spread throughout Europe to

permeate the political and media worlds. However, it is noteworthy that France’s previous
experiences with terrorism during the Algerian War of Independence had also been linked to
157

Islam, seeing as much of the rhetoric used by the FLN was inspired by the sentiments of Islam.

Capitalizing on the Outcomes of Terrorism: Front National
Having explained the physical, psychological, and political effects of terrorism on a
national populace, it remains to show how the FN has capitalized on these exacerbating factors.
To recount the major findings of this chapter the first major point is that terrorism results in
heightened levels of fear and anger. These psychological states, in turn, result in increased
seeking-out of political information by means of media consumption in the case of fear, and in
an increased desire to participate in the political process in the case of anger. Additionally, it has
been recorded that political novices are impacted by the onset of fear and anger following acts of
terrorism to a greater degree.158 This is a logical finding, as previously politically involved
members of the public would not experience as significant a change in their participation due to
their already extensive levels of involvement. It is now necessary to return to the existence of
populism as an entity, its platform, and its allure to the fearful and disgruntled.
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For the FN, it is not a difficult task to capitalize on fears of Islamic fundamentalism as
their own programme in 2012 had denounced the religion as “an inherently dangerous religion
159

that does not respect the separation between state and church.”

This belief system which

originated with Jean-Marie Le Pen, has been perpetuated under the tenure of his daughter,
Marine Le Pen, and has placed the FN in a perfect position to benefit off of the increase in
Islamophobic sentiments. Not only does the current discourse on terrorism demonstrate that
terrorism is followed by increased support for authoritarian, far-right policies concerning
security, the previous efforts of the FN leadership to define their party as an expert on issues of
security has led to increased focus on the advice and rhetoric of the FN.
First one must examine the evidence of change in support for the FN in France following
the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016. In December of 2015, William Horobin, a journalist for
the Wall Street Journal wrote an article stressing the gains in regional election representation that
the FN was bound to make following the November Paris Attacks due to Marine Le Pen’s
framing of the situation; with her calls for tighter security ignored by the existing socialist
government and the resulting deaths a product of that incompetence.
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By placing herself at the

forefront of France’s debate on security, Marine Le Pen successfully cast Hollande and his
government as ill-prepared and incapable of protecting the public. Beyond Le Pen’s personal
image, the acts of terrorism in France resulted in the passing of several major laws which could
be described as extreme-right and authoritarian. The most important policy being the initiation of
the State of Emergency, which in coming from a socialist government, represented a vote of
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support for the FN’s authoritarian security preferences without the FN leadership needing to take
responsibility for any negative repercussions.

Conclusion
Terrorism is a global phenomenon even if the majority of its coverage comes from the
handful of Western European states and the U.S, and the immediate short-term effects are always
similar. Fear spreads outwards as individuals recognize their peace to be shattered and that fear
often leads individuals to increase their value for information in their efforts to regain control
over the new threat. It is after this initial preconscious reaction that individuals begin to form
new opinions and strategies based off of those opinions. During this time, the framing of
terrorism is crafted by the media and politicians as they attempt to harness the increased levels of
political involvement and the increased willingness of the public to place in leaders viewed as
capable of addressing the threat. This relationship explains why socialist president, Francois
Hollande, failed to maintain a tolerant and accepting approach towards French Muslims in the
aftermath of the 2015 terror attacks and instead chose to initiate a State of Emergency. This
action provided for increased occurrences of police brutality and discriminatory actions against
Muslim citizens and further legitimized the platform of the FN.
While the events of 2015 and 2016 clearly demonstrate a valid source for Islamophobic
sentiment in their connections to Islam and, in the case of Charlie Hebdo, their primary
motivations, the framing of these terrorist events points clearly to the underlying sentiments of
Islamophobia left over from France’s history. The portrayal of the events by the media initially
focused on the events as they occurred, their quick transition to a more politicized and thematic

68

approach to understanding the motivations for the terror events demonstrates this very bias
inherent in the French identity.161
The acts of terrorism in 2015 and 2016 shook the French world. Not since the 2nd world
war had lives been lost in the numbers brought on by the November attacks, and the responses to
these attacks have been various and flavored with the history of the French people. As with most
nations who have experienced the horrors of an act of terrorism the people of France exhibited
widespread reactions of fear and anger following the 2015 attacks. In the immediate aftermath of
both of these events, there was a demonstrably higher consumption of tv news media by French
citizens seeking to gain information about the new situation.162 These events were also followed
by noticeable increases in political participation by means of voting numbers and willingness to
demonstrate in rallies.
This chapter has sought out to prove is that the revival of terrorist activity in France after
twenty years has succeeded in reawakening French Islamophobic sentiment. The resulting
sentiments of fear and anger, framed by the national media, have resulted in political shifts in
preferences concerning security values, as well as changes in the trust levels for the existing
governments. This uncertainty is what Marine Le Pen played upon following the November Paris
attacks and it resulted in several regional successes for the FN in December of 2015. All in all,
this chapter’s goal is to demonstrate how Islamophobia was reinvigorated by these terrorist
events, and how the resulting treatment of these events by the media, the government, and the
FN have further exacerbated tensions between the Muslim minority in France, and those most
likely to increase their participation in French politics following acts of terror.
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Terrorism reminds the public that the government is in charge of safeguarding their
safety and security against all domestic and foreign threats. “Governments are expected to
maintain public order and, in time of crisis, to (re)create order. They do so through the
manipulation of images, symbols, and rituals.”163 Regarding the reactions of Hollande’s
government, the events of 2015 and 2016 did call into question his ability to provide for the
security of his people. This threat to popular support incentivized the socialist government to
enact policies which would otherwise be seen as extreme-right, authoritarian policies in the face
of growing public unrest.
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A Clash of Cultures: Islamophobia and the European Refugee Crisis
Introduction
The FN supports several major policies, but their primary focus is on the immigration
issue faced by France, specifically concerning the immigration of Muslims. In 2015, the nation
of Syria experienced a mass exodus as its people attempted to escape the violence and bloodshed
which have come to ravage the country in the internationally-backed battle between the Assad
regime and the various rebel forces. These migrants have spread over the globe in a great
diaspora and many have made their way to the borders of the European Union, in which they
now seek and claim asylum from the violence in their homeland. As of this point in time, nearly
four million refugees and migrants have applied for asylum in the EU.164 Among its colleagues,
France has accepted some of the largest numbers of refugees in the past four years. This influx
has added to the already substantial Muslim immigrant population present in France and has
provided increased ammunition for anti-immigrant parties playing on the public's fear for
personal safety and job security. Because of pre-existing perceived threats attributed to Islam and
Muslims by the French population, the increase in immigrant population and visibility has stoked
feelings of anxiety among the French population.165 In turn, the government has repeatedly
responded to these growing fears and tensions by instituting increasingly authoritarian security
measures which asymmetrically target Muslims and their faith.
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France’s trouble with accepting Muslim immigrants is not a new development. As
discussed in chapter one, the French government has often mistreated Muslim immigrants based
on fears of their cultural influence and more realistic threats of violence and job security posed
by the integration of a large migrant population. The tensions derived from France’s previous
interactions with Algerian terrorism and Muslim religiosity remain present in discussions of the
impact of the arriving refugees, and several prominent figures in French politics have spoken
against the acceptance of further refugees, whose arrival coincides with the renewed occurences
of terrorism.
While normally the presence of individuals from groups identified as different from
oneself will lead to improved relations and a process of de-exotification in the minds of
dominant parties guilty of ‘othering,’ the people of France are not experiencing such a process.166
Instead, the increased presence of Muslims in France, which already is home to the largest
Muslim minority of any Western European state, has exacerbated tensions between Muslims and
non-Muslims and resulted in increased sentiments of Islamophobia among white middle-class
French citizens.
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The process of exacerbated tensions, derived from the cultural and religious

differences over issues such as gender-equality, religious tolerance, secularity, and essential
freedoms, has resulted in a situation which falls under the predictions of Threat and Conflict
Theory.
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the existing psychological theories on contact
with out-groups. This analysis is necessary to explain why the French situation predisposes
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France towards a negative and inflammatory reaction to increased levels of migrants and
refugees. Following the general theory will be a comparison with the French historical case and
an explanation of why their history, their values, and their culture all demonstrate a dynamic
with the beliefs of Islam which lend themselves more to threat and conflict than reconciliation.
After the general set up will be a look first at the reactions to Muslim immigration more
generally, followed by a focus on the facts, framing, and results of the European Refugee Crisis
on France. Finally, as with previous chapters, a final section will provide analysis and discussion
concerning the value of mass Muslim immigration as a catalyzing factor supporting the rise of
the FN as an accepted populist political party.

Relevant Theory on Interactions between In-Groups and Out Groups
Gordon Allport addresses the issue of xenophobia and the possible solution to such
prejudice in his Contact Theory. His proposition of Contact Theory states that proximity and
healthy interactions between in-group and out-group members are likely to foster increased
168

harmony and understanding over time.

His belief stems from psychological research stating

that xenophobic prejudices are derived in large part from the designation of something as
unknown and exotic.169 Therefore, given time and contact with those originally dehumanized
because of their mystery, inter-group similarities are discovered which help to disabuse the
170

in-group of the “negative stereotypes” imposed on the out-group.

In coming to know

something, fears stemming from uncertainty disappear and are replaced with rational knowledge
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and understanding. This mirrors the trends found in society that higher levels of education are
171

correlated with decreased ‘othering’ and baseless hatred.

Allport does recognize that proximity and interaction alone do not for certain result in
decreased xenophobic sentiments. To have contact theory function, the two groups must interact
172

in peaceful ways, without experiencing any symbolic or realistic threats from one another.

Part

of being able to know something comes from the finding of common ground and beliefs between
peoples. When the differences that separate people come not from physically non-threatening
features, but from symbolically irreconcilable divisions and realistic threats to life and property,
the increased rate of interactions can serve not as a mitigating element but as an exacerbating
one.
Several major theories have arisen to address these possible shortcomings in Allport’s
Contact Theory. These theories focus on three forms of threat perceptions leading to prejudice
which are particularly applicable to the relations between French and Muslims. One major theory
which contradicts Allport’s somewhat optimistic contact theory is known as Integrated Threat
Theory, which proposed that prejudices arise from four types of threat.173 This theory has been
updated in recent years as two of the threat forms, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes
were determined to be products of the other two threat categories.174 The new Intergroup Threat
Theory (ITT) proposed by Walter Stephan, Ybarra, and Mosu, focuses on two types of perceived
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threats to make the assertion that individuals in the in-group who perceive the presence of a
threat posed by an out-group to the well-being and prosperity of the in-group will react to
increased interaction with increased levels of anxiety and fear. The two forms of perceived
threats maintained by this theory are realistic threats and symbolic threats.
Realistic threats were first explored under the assumptions posed in Realistic Conflict
Theory (RCT). They refer to the concerns of an in-group of physical quantifiable danger
presented by the introduction of a less establish and less privileged out-group. Realistic fears can
manifest from fear of job security, fear of violent action against the in-group, or destruction of
material property belonging to the in-group.
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Fears of safety and material prosperity are

commonly associated with increased levels of prejudice. For Europe in general, anti-Muslim
prejudice is focused primarily on this form of threat in the framing of Muslims as a threat to job
176

security and a catalyst for increased crime rates.

The second perceived threat considered by Intergroup Threat Theory is that of perceived
symbolic threat. Symbolic threats are seen as threatening differences in cultural norms,
traditions, or tightly held values between groups.177 For the purposes of this paper, that would be
referring to the threat posed by the hyper-religiosity of Islam vis à vis French commitment to
secularism. A perceived symbolic threat occurs when a dominant group determines that an
out-group’s cultural and ideological values present a danger to the continued supremacy of the
dominant group’s ideology. While this threat does not directly suppose the introduction of
physical harm as a result of the encroaching of an outgroup, it does focus on the ability of
foreign and exotic cultures to change the atmosphere and assault the cultural values of the
175
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established in-group.178 The fear inherent in this threat comes from a sense of pride in one’s faith
and culture. To have that culture threatened by encroaching cosmopolitanism is one of the
driving forces behind the support for the FN.179
While not a part of ITT directly, another perceived threat relevant to the French case
against immigration is the Terrorism Threat Theory (TTT). Going beyond physical damages and
deprivations of leisure and opportunity, and solidifying the differences in values, TTT focuses on
an in-group’s belief that the out-group is capable of committing extensive acts of violence with
the intention being loss of life and/or damage of property on a significant scale.180 This theory
came into prominence following the events of 9/11, as terrorism became a primary associated to
physical safety.181 While Muslims themselves are not directly associated with Terrorism theory,
Islam, or more accurately the fundamentalist interpretation which Europeans tend to prescribe to
182

all Muslims, is perceived to encourage the taking of life en masse through acts of terror.

This

perceived threat to the safety of a community is derived from genuine threats posed by
fundamentalism but is likely to become a framed threat as terrorism is often politicized once the
discourse goes beyond the physical events. By associating terrorism with a specific out-group, a
political movement can gain support by harnessing the resulting anger as the public designates a
specific group as responsible for their anxiety.183
Beyond the notions of perceived threats and their ability to instill grounded prejudice in
the in-group, the topic of immigration in general poses a possible source of anxiety for any
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nation. This is because the introduction of change to a previous stable situation often forms
feelings of uncertainty. Immigration is particularly significant in analyzing the reactions of the
government as immigration is a type of fear that can be framed and politicized to promote certain
political and social changes and preferences.184 Unlike natural disasters and other potential
sources of anxiety, immigration does not pose an inherent threat by its existence. Immigration
can indeed be construed as a positive element in the adding of new cultures, ideas, and
advancements to society. However, political parties often make decisions on the ease and value
of immigration a partisan matter, and for those using immigration as a threat, the anxiety they
can instill in the public directly benefits their platform through the exacerbation of anxious
sentiments. This anxiety leads to individuals seeking out political elites who present themselves
as capable of addressing the causes of anxiety.185 The other side to this association is that
politicians and leaders are more likely to adopt hardline, authoritarian policies regarding issues
of immigration and security when anxiety becomes a widespread sentiment.
To briefly review xenophobic populism, the primary source of support garnered by the
newest wave of populist movements in Europe is that of xenophobic sentiment and the ability of
populist leaders to frame a designated ‘other’ as a threat to the established safety and security of
society. Immigration, when paired with pre-existing prejudices and sentiments of fear and hatred,
creates the perfect scapegoat for populist rhetoricians to use in establishing the source of
common troubles of the people like job scarcity and in the case of Islam, fear of terrorism.186
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Why French-Islamic relations adhere to Threat Theories
As addressed in the introduction, France is home to the largest Muslim minority
population of any European nation, with approximately 10% of the Muslim refugees in Europe
187

being housed in France.

This significant influx of visibly different peoples into France

exacerbated tensions in the readjustment of standard living and the exposure to Islamic practices.
This issue became particularly pronounced when the Muslim migrants transitioned from
practicing their faith in cellars to practicing in the public eye with the transition from temporary
workers to citizens of France.188 When changes are made to the standard living styles of
individuals, anxiety is likely to occur. Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening
World specifically addresses the fears and concerns brought on by mass immigration in several
of its chapters, and France herself has experienced mass influxes of Muslim immigrants at
multiple times throughout her history under the governance of the Fifth Republic.
Muslim immigrants have always faced difficulties in gaining French citizenship. From
the outset, Muslims were viewed with suspicion concerning their religious views and practices
and were persecuted with regard to their efforts to integrate into French society. “In practice, an
Algerian who sought citizenship under French civil law had to renounce his local status,
effectively requiring him to abandon Islam.”189 The severity of the requirements to gain French
citizenship led to insignificant numbers of Algerian immigrants successfully gaining French
citizenship. “Between 1865 and 1962 only 7,000 Algerians acquired French citizenship through
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this naturalization process.”190 When compared to the millions of Muslim French citizens the
now reside in France, the change in France over the last 57 years becomes all the more vivid.
The problem that arises comes from France’s continued distrust of Islam and the unshakable
history of violence and ‘othering’ which has come to define the Franco-Islamic interactions for
nearly two centuries.191
As has been addressed by multiple policial scientists and historians, this large minority
population is particularly difficult for France due to the various values and ideals held at the
heart of the French identity. Unlike her European counterparts, France has held rigid in several
observances dating back to colonial times. Among these are the commitment to secularism, the
universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and the belief that to be French is to abide by
the cultural norms listed above. Against these values, the perceived zealous nature of Muslims
was seen as a threat to France’s liberal commitment to the removal of religious observance from
public spaces.
How does the influx of Muslims provide a perceived, realistic threat to the average
middle class French citizen? For one, the increase in underprivileged Muslims in France was
quickly framed by the FN and other conservative parties as a threat to job security and the
reasons behind periods of high unemployment in France.192 The 1990s saw increased
scapegoating of the Muslim population as the reasons behind exacerbated unemployment in
France, and was championed strongly by the FN.193 Furthermore, the French period of
colonialism cemented certain perceptions of Muslims and their faith in the French memory,
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including associations with violence and laziness, enabling negative stereotypical depictions of
Muslims as threats to public safety and prosperity.194

Going back to colonial perceptions, the French have viewed Islam as a threat to French
republican values since the colonization of Algeria forced increased interactions between the two
groups. The hyper-religiosity observed to be part of the Islamic faith, represented by the wearing
of religious garments and the perceived fanatical belief in the power and guidance of their lord
left the French unsettled. This zealous nature of Muslims directly conflicts with French
secularism, as made into law in 1905. Additionally, the differences in the ways that Muslim men
and women are treated presents another symbolic threat to French liberal values of equality and
freedom. The unequal treatment of women evokes fears that Islamification undermines the
values of universalism and equality the French pride themselves on supporting.195
Islam has long been associated with acts of terrorism going back to the usage of terrorist
shootings and bombings in the Algerian Revolutions by members of the FLN.196

France’s Handling of Muslim Immigration from 1960 to 2015: A Failure to Integrate
Seeing as how French society has associated Islam and Muslims with all forms of
prevalent threats for generations, it is understandable that France’s efforts to integrate Muslims
into French society has been lackluster. Following the initial refusal of France to allow more than
a few thousand Algerians to acquire French citizenship before 1962, France would go on to host
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the largest proportional minority of Muslims in Western Europe.197 This substantial change in
France’s exposure to Muslims promoted anxiety among the French populace, particularly in the
post-Algerian Revolution environment of the 70s and 80s.198 The shift away from the
European-heavy migrant pool in the 60s to the non-European majority from 1982 onwards
changed the discourse on immigration as it took on a cultural and racial element.199
Politicians are incentivized to present themselves as capable to address threats to the
public in order to take advantage of the tendency for anxious citizens to exhibit increased trust in
those seen as able to remove present threats.200 Following the relaxed nature of the Mitterrand
government, public unrest surrounding the increasing visibility of Muslims and the
administration's failure to address illegal immigration made authoritarian stances on immigration
favorable positions to take.201 At the time, Jean-Marie Le Pen spoke out against the government,
claiming that their inaction was the cause of the unemployment and crime issues facing France in
the 1980s and 90s.202 This stance, which he and the FN had cultivated since their shift towards a
populist image, assisted in casting the FN not only as the outsider to politics but as the expert on
immigration.
It was in response to Mitterrand’s relaxed immigration legislation and treatment of illegal
immigrants that the FN’s stance on French national identity formed as staunchly
anti-cosmopolitan. The FN believed that French nationality was a status that needed to be earned
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through commitment to the values of French republican society, and that only through complete
compliance with French values can one become truly French.203
The governments of Chirac and Sarkozy rose in a post-Mitterrand environment which
was characterized by increasingly visible distrust and fear of the growing Muslim population
which had been allowed to proliferate under the previous socialist regime. Following Mitterrand,
an election followed between Jacques Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen, and while Chirac won and
proclaimed it a victory against xenophobia, his passiveness in suppressing Islamophobic
sentiments positioned him more as an observer than any form of champion for the oppressed.204
It was under his governance that his fellow conservative counterpart, Nicolas Sarkozy, began to
influence the treatment of Muslims in France through increased Islamophobic rhetoric and the
passing of legislation predicated on French republican values, but targeting the Muslim minority
asymmetrically.205
In 2004, The French government instituted a ban on the wearing of the hijab in schools
and framed it as a defense of French secularism: banning religious emblems in public spaces.206
In reality, the action to outlaw the wearing of visible religious garbs in centers of education of
uniquely targeted at Muslims as the wearing of small religious emblems was permitted, leaving
Christians and Jews relatively unaffected by the new law.207 “It signalled that Muslim culture
was to be subjected to regulation and restriction, opening a space within which zealotry and
racism could find expression.”208 The liberalism of secularism as it was initially intended had
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been corrupted to limit the visible presence of Islam in public spaces, a deliberate move to
prohibit Islam in France.
The year after the controversial headscarf ban, France received a reminder of the violence
that the Muslim minority was capable of when the banlieues of Paris, and other French cities
experienced widespread violent riots.209 The October Riots of 2005 demonstrated the failure of
French immigration policy as the Arab descendents of immigrants engaged in mass destruction
of property.210 This uprising was founded on sentiments of resentment in opposition to police
brutality and Islamic discrimination, which had become increasingly more present in France over
the past few years.211 Notably, these riots came following the headscarf bans imposed on Muslim
school children and comments by Nicolas Sarkozy, characterizing the inhabitants of the
banlieues as “scum” or “riffraff.”212 These inflammatory actions and proclamations by the
government, along with the high rates of unemployment and racial discrimination, incited the
most violent uprising in France since May of 1968.213
Later, in 2010, another religiously targeted law was enacted, banning the wearing of
garments covering the face in public.214 The wearing of the burqa and niqab were targeted as
threats to public security, as well as symbols of gender oppression. In this way, Conservatives
and members of the far-right validated the removal and oppression of religious expression for the
few Muslim women implicated by this law.215
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Sarkozy’s framing of Muslim immigrants as a threat to republican values, paired with
new legislation and the riots of 2005 led to increasing fears and anti-immigrant sentiments. By
2010, 38% of French citizen polled saw immigration as a positive influence on France, while
55% saw illegal immigration as a contributor to increased crime rates.216
This series of Islamophobic reactions to the influx of Muslim migrants has been
perpetuated since the Algerian Revolution. Beginning with the brutalization and murder of
Algerian nationalists, growing in public support with the increasing visibility of Islam in the
public sector, and gaining political legitimacy with the continued actions of politicians to secure
the public’s trust by passing and promoting authoritarian security measures and condemning the
presence of Islam in the banlieues. This history is the context provided for the framing and
handling of the modern European Refugee Crisis; a portrayal of Muslims as a threat to society
which has been legitimized as a threat by established, centrist governments.

European Refugee Crisis
The European Refugee Crisis began in the summer of 2015 and by September of ‘15,
264,000 refugees had applied for asylum in European countries.217 The past few years have seen
steady and tremendous increases in the number of asylum seekers with most settling in Germany,
Italy, and northern European countries. For France, who is already home to approximately 10%
of Europe’s Muslim population, the increased burden of refugees has incited outrage and
increased anti-immigrant rhetoric on the part of the FN and other conservative elements.218
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The two contextual pieces which differentiate the immigration experienced in France
from 2015 onwards are the quantity of Muslim asylum seekers and the renewed emergence of
terrorism in France from Charlie Hebdo onwards. The violence inherent in the French response
to the treatment of Muslim immigrants has been an established practice since well before the
European Refugee Crisis began in 2015. The first instances of this violence going back to the
murder of Algerian nationalists in France by Parisian police officers in the later years of the
wars, the number of which will likely never be fully determined.219 As Muslim presence became
more visible with the practicing of Islam in increasingly public spaces, it became apparent that
the French population was negatively affected by perceived threats attributed to the increasing
Muslim minority. This perceived sense of threat continues to frame public perceptions of Muslim
immigrants and, when combined with the added fear of renewed mass terrorism, offers an
opportunity for the far-right to make increased gains in support.
Marine Le Pen has framed the influx of new refugees much in the same manner she
always had; Muslims represent a threat to French jobs, ideals, and safety, and France must not
continue to accept further immigrants into a country which has already become saturated with
Muslims over the past several decades. The fact that the majority of the asylum seekers come
from Syria, which has been directly associated with the November Paris attacks through the
presence of ISIS, is an important connection.220
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Framing the Refugee Crisis to Benefit the Front National
As with most populist political parties, the Front National (FN) is staunchly
anti-immigration, with a particular focus on opposing the influx of Muslim immigrants from the
Middle East and North Africa. Chapters two and three have already discussed how the FN gained
much of its initial following and support from running on a platform which proclaimed France
for the French. Jean-Marie Le Pen vehemently opposed the influx of Arab immigrants from
before the creation of the FN and cemented those beliefs into the foundation of the party in 1972.
221

While elements of biological racism and anti-semitism have disappeared from the party’s

rhetoric under the guidance of Marine Le Pen, the anti-Islamic sentiments have been preserved.
When immigration is discussed as a threat to French values, it is immigration from North Africa
222

which dominates the discourse, rather than intra-European immigration.

The Refugee Crisis,

and frankly all immigration by Muslims from the Middle-East and North Africa serve the
platform of the FN as a visible and easily discriminated scapegoat. From the increase in Arab
immigrants in the mid-twentieth century, to the modern refugee crisis, the increasing population
of Muslims has fueled the FN and is a major mechanism through which populism is strengthened
by Islamophobia.
Xenophobic populism often rises up when a majority in-group of a society perceives their
position as becoming threatened by a proportionally increasing minority population which they
differentiate from themselves through a number of means.223 France’s uniquely stubborn
interpretation of French identity allows populist parties to draw upon cultural heritage to a
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greater extent than normally would be possible. This is because, while not universally accepted
by the French, the common discourse on French national identity states that anyone can become
French, but to become French is to abandon one’s own identity in exchange for complete
adherence to the French ideals.

224

Thanks to the perceived threats presented by Muslim

immigration and refugees, it becomes easy for Marine Le Pen and the FN to claim republican
values in their defense of French identity throughout the 1990s.225

Conclusion
Because the French perception of Muslims and Islam has been saturated with threat
prejudice from colonial past, political portrayal, and media portrayal, The increased level of
interaction does not subvert negative stereotypes, but instead exacerbates fear of physical and
ideological damage to France brought on by Muslim Immigrants. The FN uses this fear to grow
and solidify their voter base, consisting in large part of uneducated, unemployed individuals, as
well as those believing in the singular version of French identity. The FN scapegoats Muslims as
the cause of unemployment, generalizes them as all in adherence with the fundamentalists, and
blames immigration as the cause of terrorism and deems it a security risk.226
As demonstrated during the 2017 Presidential election, Marine Le Pen and the FN might
have a chance at obtaining and maintaining a strong plurality in France, but are unlikely to
overcome the second round majority barrier as the majority of the French public still views the
FN as an extremist, anti-democratic, heir to fascism. The real threat laid out by the information
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accumulated here is the threat of normalization of hatred. While the FN might never hold the
presidency, both Jean-Marie and Marine have, in their times, applied pressure through their
movement upon the presiding government to initiate and enact laws which lean far-right of
center. From the Security act to the consideration of removing citizenship from natural
dual-citizens, Hollande considered significant authoritarian responses to the growing discontent
in France with the increasing levels of immigrant presence and terrorism.
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Conclusion
Fear is a powerful motivation. Humans detest the feeling of not being in control of their
reality. The presence of perceived threats or violent disasters often focuses the mind on its own
mortality and catalyzes it to seek out way to mitigate the risk to its safety. This instinct of the
human body to sek safety from threats is, on its own, a valuable characteristic which keeps
humans alive. When an unframed disaster such as a hurricane or a school shooting occurs, it is
healthy to react in fear. However, when the fear that one experiences is based on perceived
threats of violence, regardless of the actual level of threat present, then that fear inhibits the mind
from successfully and logically processing information. To have an irrational fear of something
or someone is to sacrifice the ability to reason and logically come to understand the source of
that fear. Additionally, as human beings seek to control their fears through the gathering of
information, it is fairly simple for sources of information to impart their biases unto the fearful
individuals.
The first take away from this paper must be the understanding that xenophobia can be a
powerful factor in the political calculations of a nation, especially when the nation’s history has
formed around an ethno-cultural identity as is the case with France. At the very heart of the
issue, France’s colonial roots have engrained in her a pervasive Islamophobic sentiment which
influences political discourse on all sides of the political spectrum. This history of oppression
and violence has created lasting negative stereotypes which have come to be validated on the
logic of French republicanism. It is sobering to understand the reality of the corruption of French
universalism and secularism. The politicization of these liberal policies has transformed their
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purpose from one of tolerance and protection, to one of intolerance and targeted religious censor.
Because French perceptions of Islam have been integrally biased since the period of colonization
in the early-1880s, the ability of the French to logically consider the actual impacts of Islam on
the French republican experience is impeded. Specifically, the hyper-religiosity and perceived
intolerance than has come to be associated with the faith of Islam, frames it as inherently
antagonistic toward the central pillars of French society.
French adherence to their values of liberte, egalite, and fraternite are considered to be
necessarily universal; anyone who comes to France has an obligation to adhere to these policies
of tolerance and acceptance. These values are the foundations of French liberalism and have
been enacted to safeguard the rights of the French. However, previously existing animosity
between the French and Algerians has transformed values of tolerance into weapons of
normalization. The FN under Marine Le Pen has made stride in the political realm because she
has convince many in France that her policies come not from a place of hatred for Muslims, but
from a desire to protect France and her liberal ideals of tolerance and freedom.
The Front Nationale has experienced significant increases in support in the decades since
its creation in 1972. While at first Jean-Marie Le Pen experienced in-party schisms and pitifully
low levels of support, the party has evolved to appeal to French citizens regardless of traditional
political affiliations. The party has gained attention and support through their incendiary remarks
on the state of the nation of France, often relying on the scapegoating of the Muslim immigrant
population in France as the source of threats to France’s republican ideology, safety and
well-being, and job security for the average Frenchman. From their inception to now, it has been
the ability of the FN leadership to capitalize upon Islamophobic sentiment which has aided in the
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rise to prominence and elevation from fringe to party-politics. Beyond their own electoral
success, the FN has experienced great success through the normalization of their beliefs among
French political elites and the general public. In fact, the most dangerous element of the FN’s
rise to prominence might not be the potential for a FN candidate to rise to the position of
President of France. The most dangerous implication of this paper, is that the FN will be able to
spread their influence and policies to the extent that their policies will become normalized and
accepted by centrist party politicians.
The open racism of Nicolas Sarkozy and the reactionary authoritarian policies of Francois
Hollande illustrate a break from traditional centrist party lines. Where under Mitterrand and de
Gaulle, policies remained polarized on traditional issues of market economics and social welfare,
the new debate has been guided by the Front National: the debate between isolation and
integration. By driving politics towards debates on the presence of, and threats posed by, ethnic
minorities, the FN has cemented itself at the heart of party politics and successfully framed itself
not as an extreme-right, fanatical party, but a party focused on protecting French values for the
French. By choosing the growing Muslim minority as their scapegoat, the FN has successfully
capitalized on the perceived threats of Islam held by many of the French public. The French
public, through their consumption of threatening media in times of crisis, has shifted their
preferences which in turn influence the centrist parties of France and provide for a cycle of
increasing Islamophobic sentiments, support for the FN, and normalization of their authoritarian,
xenophobic security and immigration policies.
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